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ABSTRACT 
DETERMINANTS OF WORKERS’ REMITTANCES: 
 EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY 
Aydaş, Osman Tuncay 
Master of Economics 
Supervisors: Assist. Prof. Bilin Neyaptı and Assoc. Prof. Kıvılcım Metin-Özcan 
September, 2002 
In this thesis, macroeconomic determinants of workers’ remittances are analyzed for the case of 
Turkey, using annual data over the period 1964-2001. Using two different models, in contrast to 
some previous analyses, we find that macroeconomic variables and variables related with 
economic and political risk in the country of origin significantly impact on remittance inflows. 
According to empirical results, remittance flows are highly responsive to the differential between 
the official and black market exchange rates. In both models, we observe that the difference 
between the black market and official rate of exchange has a significant negative impact on the 
inflow of remittances. Domestic rate of inflation also has a significant negative impact on 
remittances, indicating a negative correlation between economic instability in home country and 
remittance inflows. Results also reveal that the interest rate differential between the country of 
origin and host country has a significant positive impact on remittances. Periods of military 
administration in Turkey also have a significant negative impact on remittance inflows, indicating 
a negative correlation between political instability in home country and remittance inflows. 
Hence, contrary to some previous studies, our results, based on the evidence from Turkey, 
suggest that governments of labor-exporting countries can influence remittance inflows through 
inflation, exchange rate and interest rate policies. 
 
Key Words: Workers’ Remittances, Black Market Premium, Real Overvaluation, Interest 
Differentials 
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ÖZET 
İŞÇİ DÖVİZLERİNİ BELİRLEYEN ETKENLER: 
TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ 
Aydaş, Osman Tuncay 
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanları: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Bilin Neyapti ve Doç. Dr. Kıvılcım Metin-Özcan 
Eylül, 2002 
Bu tezde işçi dövizlerini belirleyen makroekonomik etkenler, Türkiye örneği üzerinde, 1964-
2001 peryodu yıllık verileri kullanılarak incelenmiştir. İki farklı model kullanılarak, bundan 
önceki bir kısım çalışmaların aksine makroekonomik değişkenlerin ve işçi gönderen ülkedeki 
ekonomik ve siyasal riskle ilgili değişkenlerin işçi dövizlerinin ülkeye akışı üzerinde önemli 
ölçüde etkisi olduğu bulunmuştur. Sonuçlara göre döviz akışları resmi döviz kurları ile kara borsa 
döviz kurları arasındaki farkdan çok etkilenmektedir. İki modelde de resmi döviz kurları ile kara 
borsa döviz kurları arasındaki farkın döviz akışı üzerinde önemli ölçüde negatif etkisinin olduğu 
ortaya çıkmıştır. İşçi gönderen ülkedeki enflasyonun da işçi dövizlerini negatif yönde etkilediği 
tespit edilmiştir, bu bize ülkedeki ekonomik istikrarsızlıkla işçi dövizi akışlarının arasındaki ters 
orantıya işaret etmektedir. Sonuçlar ayrıca işçi gönderen ülke ile işçi alan ülke arasındaki faiz 
farklarının işçi dövizleri üzerinde önemli ölçüde bir pozitif etkisinin olduğunu ortaya çıkarmıştır. 
Türkiye’deki askeri yönetim dönemlerinin de işçi dövizleri üzerinde önemli ölçüde negatif 
etkisinin olduğu bulunmuştur, bu bize ülkedeki siyasi istikrarsızlıkla işçi dövizi akışlarının 
arasındaki ters orantıya işaret etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmadaki sonuçlarla, bundan önceki 
bir kısım çalışmaların aksine, işçi ihraç eden ülkelerin hükümetlerinin enflasyon, döviz kuru ve 
faiz oranları politikalarıyla işçi dövizi akışlarını etkileyebileceği Türkiye örneğini kullanılarak 
gösterilmiştir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İşçi Dövizleri, Kara Borsa Primi, Reel Aşırı Değerlenme, Faiz Farkları 
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CHAPTER 1:     INTRODUCTION 
 
The volume of international migration has been increasing since the end of the Second World 
War. International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates the worldwide population of migrant 
workers to be between 36 and 42 million in year 1999 (see, ILO Bulletin of International 
Migration, 2000). One important aspect of migration has been the remittances of migrant 
workers. Remittances are the part of the payment of the worker that goes back to the country 
of origin. World Bank definition of remittances includes three streams of money flowing into 
countries: workers’ remittances (value of money transfers sent home from workers who reside 
abroad for more than a year); compensation of workers (gross earnings of workers residing 
abroad for less than a year, including the value in-kind benefits, such as housing and payroll 
taxes) and; migrant transfers (net worth of migrants who move from one country to another) 
(Neyaptı, 2001). According to Murinde (1993), remittances are a major source of foreign 
exchange for many developing countries, where its limited availability could therefore act as 
a major constraint on economic development programs and stabilization policy.         
 
Since workers’ remittances are a major source of foreign exchange for labor-exporting 
countries, the determinants of workers’ remittances are of central concern for those 
economies. In order to attract these foreign exchange flows, appropriate macroeconomic 
policies must be developed and special laws must be formed to give incentives to workers 
abroad who want to remit their earnings. Another important factor in this context is the 
existence of unofficial channels for international capital flows. El Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) 
indicate that: “Since many labor exporting countries have well-established informal 
mechanisms through which remittance earnings can be channeled, it is important to establish 
the factors that influence the amount of migrants’ savings that go through official channels as 
opposed to those that find their way into unofficial channels, most notably the black market.” 
Developing appropriate macroeconomic policies and laws that will attract remittances and 
preventing the flow of remittances to the unofficial market, all require that key determinants 
of workers’ remittances are well-understood. 
  
The determinants of workers’ remittances are mainly grouped into two in the literature (see, 
for example, Russell, 1986). The determinants of workers’ remittances in the first group 
mostly includes variables regarding the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants and 
their families, such as the marital status of migrant, number of children of the family of 
migrant; years of education of migrant and the family and the employment status of other 
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family members, occupational level of migrant, etc. The second approach, however mainly 
considers macroeconomic and political variables as well as variables related with the 
institutional environment. Much of the literature, however, has concentrated on the 
determinants of workers’ remittances in the first group rather than on the macroeconomic 
variables that may influence the flow of migrants’ savings to their countries of origin. In 
addition, the evidence in the literature regarding the impact of macroeconomic variables, such 
as interest rate differentials, black market premium and domestic rate of inflation, on 
remittances is not conclusive.  
 
According to Swamy (1981), the number of migrants abroad and their wages explain over 
90% of the variation in remittance inflows. Swamy (1981) also include that, the level of, and 
cyclical fluctuations in, economic activity in the host countries explained 70 to 90% of the 
variation in the remittances. On the other hand, Swamy (1981) argues that "incentive" interest 
rates in the country of origin relative to the interest rate in the host countries, the difference 
between the black market exchange rate and the official exchange rate, that is the black 
market premium, in the home country do not affect total remittance flows significantly. Since 
governments of labor-exporting countries introduced special incentive schemes to increase 
the flow of workers’ remittances through official channels, Swamy’s results question the use 
of such policies. On the other hand, Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) explain Swamy (1981)’s 
failure to find a significant impact of interest differentials on remittances by a potential 
correlation with interest differentials and other variables included in the model.  
 
Straubhaar (1986), develops a simple model to examine the remittances of Turkish workers in 
Germany. In support of Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986) argues that: “Contrary to the 
conventional belief, the incentives to attract emigrants’ remittances have not been very 
successful. Neither variation in exchange rates, reflecting the governmental intention to 
attract remittances by premium exchange rates, nor changes in the real return of investments 
(reflecting the governmental intention to attract remittances by foreign exchange deposits 
with higher returns) affect the flows of remittances towards Turkey.” 
 
In contrast with the conclusions of Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar (1986), Chandavarkar 
(1980), Katselli and Glytsos (1989) and Wahba (1991), all argue that a macro economic 
policy framework developed on competitive interest and exchange rates would enable 
governments of labor exporting countries to attract remittances through official channels. 
Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) and El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) agree on the significance of the 
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impact of macroeconomic policy on remittances, but they contrast on the direction and 
significance of the impact of some variables. For example, they agree on the negative effect 
of the black market premium, but they disagree on the effect of differential interest rate and 
domestic inflation. According to Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), differential between domestic 
and foreign interest rates has no significant effect on remittances, while El-Sakka and Mcnabb 
(1999) argue that it negatively affects the remittances. Also, Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) 
argue that domestic inflation negatively affect the remittance flow, while El-Sakka and 
Mcnabb (1999) argue that it positively affect the remittances. So, the evidence in the literature 
regarding the impact of macroeconomic variables on remittance inflows has not reached to a 
consensus. 
 
As also indicated in El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999), the contradictory findings reported in the 
literature may reflect the fact that the focus of some studies is often limited to only a few 
macroeconomic variables often ignoring key determinants such as the black market exchange 
rate. In addition, because of the lack of data in labor exporting countries estimation periods of 
most studies are really short. Also, the estimations in previous studies (see, for example, 
Elbadawi and Rocha [1992], El-Sakka and Mcnabb [1999]) are generally based on modeling 
remittances with the levels of potential determinant variables, while these variables are 
generally non-stationary. All these factors lead us to question the reliability of the general 
conclusions in the previous literature. 
 
In this study, further evidence regarding the impact of macroeconomic variables on 
remittance inflows is presented using Turkish data. Turkish workers’ migration abroad started 
in the early 1960s with mainly to Western Europe and especially to the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Since the early 1960s, over 2 million Turkish workers have migrated for 
employment to about 30 countries. The inflow of Turkish workers’ remittances started to 
grow slowly after 1964, and after then the amount of remittances reached considerable 
amounts and became an important source of external financing for Turkey. In 1970, 
remittances reached 20 %, in 1976 reached the highest level with 90 % and beginning from 
1990, it remained to be around 20 % of total exports. The Turkish Government has developed 
a number of policies to encourage migrants’ remittances, such as special exchange rates for 
remittances, special interest rates for the foreign currency accounts maintained by the Turks 
abroad with the Turkish Central Bank and special import privileges for consumer goods and 
machinery. 
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This study examines the significance and the direction of the impact of macroeconomic 
variables on workers’ remittances for the case of Turkey. We question the role of key 
macroeconomic variables, such as, interest differentials, black market premium, per capita 
income in domestic and host countries, and variables related with the economic and political 
risk in the home country, such as, military administration dummy, rate of growth and 
inflation, in explaining variations in remittance flows. The empirical analysis is based on 
annual data for 1964-2001 period, which is lengthier than the previous studies. We develop 
models that are based on the first differences of variables. The estimation results are also 
tested with relevant diagnostic tests. 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, the historical background 
regarding the significance of migration and remittances in the world is reviewed with a 
specific emphasis on Turkey. Also, past four decades of Turkish experience with migration; 
economic and political context in Turkey in the initial periods of migration; the magnitude 
and development of Turkish workers’ remittances; and the official attitude of Turkish 
government towards migrants and remittances are discussed. In Chapter 3, previous literature 
related with determinants of workers’ remittances is presented. In Chapter 4, theoretical 
considerations regarding the potential determinants of workers’ remittances are discussed and 
based on this discussion  equations that are used to model remittances are presented. In 
Chapter 5, econometric theory used in this study is given. Chapter 6 presents the data used in 
the estimations. In addition, data constructions and correlations between variables are 
described. Chapter 7 reviews the results of regressions that based on models presented in 
Chapter 4. Finally in Chapter 8, the concluding remarks that can be drawn from the empirical 
results are discussed. Related tables and graphs are included in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER 2:     HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter we will firstly review the significance of migration and remittances in the 
world. Secondly, past four decades of Turkish experience with migration will be presented. 
Thirdly, the economic and political context in Turkey will be analyzed. Fourthly, the 
magnitude and development of Turkish workers’ remittances will be given. Finally, official 
attitude of Turkish government towards migrants and remittances will be discussed.  
   
2.1. Migration and Remittances  
Since the end of the Second World War international migration has been increasing. The 
worldwide population of migrant workers, who are defined as people who are economically 
active in a country of which they are not nationals but excluding asylum seekers and 
refugees, is estimated by the ILO to be between 36 and 42 million in the world. If dependants 
are added to this estimate, the total population of migrants stands at between 80 to 97 
million. Europe is the region with the highest concentration of non-nationals in the world, 
with between 26 and 30 million people who are non-national residents. (ILO, Bulletin of 
International Migration, 2000) 
 
According to Murinde (1993), remittances are the main reason for workers who choose to be 
employed abroad. From the migrants perspective, remittances from migration help them and 
their families to consume and invest more. Murinde (1993) also argue that from the 
perspective of the country of origin remittances are a major source of foreign exchange and 
its limited availability acts as a major constraint on economic development programs and 
stabilization policy. 
 
Because of these reasons, in 1975, there were 13.8 million immigrant workers in the world 
living temporarily away from their home countries; 10.3 million were working in the 
developed countries of Europe and North America; 2 million in the oil exporting countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa; and the remaining 1.5 million mainly in South and West 
Africa. (Ecevit and Zachariah, 1978) They remitted close to $8.1 billion through official 
channels alone. Since then, both labor flows and remittances have increased considerably.  
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2.2. Turkish Experience with Migration 
Turks have been migrating abroad for employment for the past four decades. Exporting 
workers abroad started in the early 60s with mainly to Western Europe and especially to the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Since the early 1960s, over 2 million Turkish workers have 
migrated for employment to about 30 countries. Turkish experience with migration can be 
better understood by Graph 2.1, showing the yearly figures of recruited workers for the 
period1961-2001.  
 
2.2.1. Bilateral Recruitment Agreements and Social Security Agreements  
Turkish migration for employment was handled through bilateral agreements with recruiting 
countries. After bilateral recruitment agreements, social security agreements were signed 
between the host countries and Turkey in order to protect and improve the social security 
rights of workers. Up to 2001, Turkey signed social security agreements with England, 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, France, Libya, Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Bilateral recruitment agreements and 
social security agreements that were signed by Turkey within 1961-2000 period are given in 
Table 2.1. 
 
2.2.2. Migration to Western Europe  
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the rapidly growing economies of France, Germany and 
England attracted large numbers of migrant workers from the countries in southern Europe. 
Organized labor migration from Turkey to Federal Republic of Germany was initiated with a 
bilateral recruitment agreement of October 1961. Turkish constitution was revised to make 
entering to and leaving Turkey a fundamental right and freedom, followed by a bilateral 
labor recruitment agreement was signed between Turkey and the Federal Republic of 
Germany in October 1961. (Abadan-Ünat, 1986)  
 
Keyder (1988) reports that only 1700 Turks were employed in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1960. Before the period of recruitment, Turks had not participated in post-war 
European labor migration, which in the late 1950s primarily involved Italians migrating to 
France, Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. Initial Turkish labor flows to the 
Federal Republic were small, but official emigration of workers soon jumped to 66 thousand 
in 1964 and 130 thousand in 1970, and then reached the highest level at 136 thousand in 
1973. Between 1961 and 1975 about 805 thousand Turks were sent to work abroad through 
the Turkish Employment Service (TES), and according to Gitmez (1989), another 120 
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thousand to 150 thousand emigrated illegally. Most of these first Turkish migrants were 
graduates of Turkish technical schools who went to the Federal Republic of Germany for 
additional training (see, Martin, 1992). The volume of yearly recruitment of Turkish workers 
to Federal Republic of Germany is shown in Graph 2.2.  
Turkish labor migration to Western Europe occurred in three phases: 
(i) European employers recruited Turkish workers during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Just the brief economic crises of 1966/1967 disturbed the development of the labor 
migration. In West Germany the number of employed Turks decreased by about a 
fourth, from 161 thousand to 123 thousand, between September 1966 and January 
1968, while in Netherlands the number of Turks decreased as well from 14,5 
thousand to 12,3 thousand (Penninx, 1982). After 1968, Turkish labor migration to 
Western Europe grew rapidly. In this first stage of migration migrant workers were 
warmly welcomed, since they took up employment in areas that the native 
populations found unattractive because of low pay or poor working conditions. 
However, the sudden rise in domestic unemployment levels as a result of the oil 
crisis of the early 1970s changed people’s attitudes to migrants. 
(ii)  The massive flow of labor migrants over the period 1968-1972 suddenly stopped in 
1973. The oil crisis forced West Germany and the Netherlands to announce the end 
of the recruitment of migrant workers, and this, in fact, marked the end of large labor 
migration from Turkey to Western Europe. When labor recruitment was stopped in 
1973, there were one million Turks on the waiting list ready to work abroad. 
However, the sudden finish of the flow of labor migrants did not mean the end of the 
migration flow as a whole. The migration flow, which was a result of the family 
reunification of Turks in West European countries and which had already begun 
before, continued and from 1974-1980 onwards, it was characterized by: an 
increasing migration of non-actives, at least of migrants who had not been recruited 
as workers in Turkey; a decrease of return migration from Western Europe to 
Turkey; and a continually increasing growth of the Turkish population in West 
European countries as a result of the increasing birth rate among Turkish migrants. 
(Penninx,1982) 
(iii) Today about 3.5 million Turks have apparently settled in Western Europe. A small 
migration flow continues between Turkey and EC countries, but this migration 
mostly involves family reunification in the EC countries and retirees coming back to 
Turkey, rather than migration from Turkey for employment in the EC countries. 
2.2.3. Migration to Middle East 
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In the second half of the 1970s, when migration to Western Europe suddenly stopped, the 
flow of labor migrants from Turkey was directed to the oil exporting Arab countries. The 
greatest demand was formed by Libya and Saudi Arabia. Initially Libya started to recruit a 
large volume of Turkish workers. In 1980, Libya recruited 15 thousand workers and in 1981 
recruitment reached the highest level with 30 thousand workers. Total number of workers 
sent to Libya from 1975 till 2001 reached to 228 thousand. Migration to Saudi Arabia also 
started in the second half of the 1970s but accelerated after 1983 and reached its highest level 
at 1992 with 46 thousand workers. Iraq also recruited Turkish workers between 1981 till 
1990, which is the starting year of the Gulf War. Total number of workers sent to Iraq in this 
period reached 42 thousand. Labor migration to this country came to an end after the start of 
the war. The patterns of migration to Saudi Arabia and Libya are demonstrated in Graphs 2.3 
and 2.4. 
 
2.2.4. Migration to the Former Soviet Republics 
When the USSR disintegrated in the beginning of the 1990s, another important phase for 
Turkish migration started. Former Republics of USSR became a major direction for Turkish 
workers searching for job abroad. The development of Turkish workers migration to Former 
Republics of USSR is shown in Graph 2.5. 
 
Turkey’s four decades of experience on migration is given in Table 2.2 in a more detailed 
way. Also the recent (1999-2001) directions of migration for Turkish workers are given in 
Table 2.3. Table 2.4, on the other hand, present numbers of Turkish Nationals, workers and 
unemployed, by country as of October 2001. However, we have to indicate that labor 
emigration data are generally misleading because Turkish migrants went abroad both through 
official channels and as tourists who later regularized their status or worked as illegal aliens. 
Martin (1992) argues that, the data given in Table 2.2 regarding the Turkish workers sent 
abroad through the Turkish Employment Service underestimates actual emigration by 20 to 
40 per cent.  
 
2.3. The Economic and Political Context in Turkey (1960-1980) 
 
The economic and political context in Turkey within the period of 1960-1980 accelerated the 
migration of Turkish workers abroad. Here, we will give a brief review of this context. When 
Turkey started the planned development in 1963, it was a dominantly agricultural country. 
Agriculture was producing about 41% of the national income and over 80% of exports were 
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agricultural. Also, agriculture was employing over three quarters of the civilian active 
population, which then amounted to almost 12 million. (Paine, 1974)  
 
Rapid industrialization and economic growth were the main concepts for the three period of 
the development planning (covering 1963-1977) in Turkey by the State Planning 
Organization (SPO). Although the first two five year development plans were reasonably 
successful in achieving their aggregate targets (in particular, an average annual growth rate 
of 7%), they were less successful in bringing about basic structural transformation in the 
economy, or in distributing the gains from development to those most in need. Also, price 
stability and improvement in the employment situation was not achieved. The employment 
steadily decreased. The official total unemployment index rose from 100 in 1962 to 162 in 
1972, and non-agricultural unemployment index from 100 to 319 during the same period. In 
1973, the official total unemployment estimate approached two million, out of an 
economically active population of nearly 16 million. Because of these facts, exporting 
workers became an increasingly attractive policy to the government, especially when it 
discovered the inflow of savings and remittances. The outflow of migrant workers was 
primarily determined by host country demand and so was subject to large fluctuations. But as 
Paine (1974) indicated: “Despite the high risk attached to the adoption of a mass labor export 
policy, the achievement of Turkey’s development plans was made increasingly dependent on 
labor export.” (p.36) 
  
The outcome of the planned economy period as indicated earlier was actually a growth of the 
industrial output and the GNP, but at the same time there were important negative effects: the 
industrialization in Turkey was mainly in the branches that are of large scale, capital-
intensive industries with high quality technological equipment and this had two 
consequences which were important for emigration: 
1. This form of industrialization created relatively little employment. In addition to that, 
population growth and the decrease of labor from the agriculture sector continued. As 
a result, the pressure to emigrate increased (official unemployment rose, in spite of 
massive emigration, from 1.4 to 2.2 million in the period 1962-1977). 
2. Although industrialization expected to have made Turkey independent of other 
countries, the opposite effect was produced. Turkey was made strongly dependent on 
other countries for the import of raw materials, semi-manufactured articles and 
technology, while the lack of foreign currency and the deficit on the balance of 
payments formed a big problem. (Penninx, 1982) 
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In the second and third five-year plans the emigration of workers and the expected flow of 
money resulting from remittances took an important place at the service of the Turkish 
development planning. As Adler (1981:82) noted: “The emphasis was on maximizing the 
outflow of individuals and the consequent inflow of hard currency little else had such high 
priority.”         
 
Between the overthrow of the Menderes-government (May 27, 1960) and the takeover by the 
military (September 12, 1980) ten changes in government had taken place. These changes in 
government also caused an unstable economic environment in Turkey and this situation 
deteriorated both the flow of migration and remittances. In order to give some insight to the 
Turkish economy, the developments on GDP and annual inflation rates within the 1964-2001 
period are given in Graphs 2.6 and 2.7.  
 
2.4. Turkish Workers’ Remittances 
 
Before 1963, the remittances of Turkish emigrants towards their home country were so small 
that they were not recorded in the Turkish balance of payments. The flow of remittances 
started to grow slowly only after 1964, the beginning of the emigration towards Germany. 
After then the amount of remittances reached considerable amounts and became an important 
source of external financing for Turkey. According to Paine (1974), in the case of Turkish 
workers abroad, it was estimated that mean savings amounted to about 36%, mean 
remittances to about 11% of mean income abroad, and that non-basic expenditure totaled 
about 10% of earnings abroad. Graph 2.8 presents the development of Turkish workers’ 
remittances for 1964-2000 period. 
 
As observed from Graph 2.8, remittances to Turkey declined dramatically first during the 
late 1970s and started to recover in mid-1979, as the government started to devalue the 
Turkish Lira. It was the first attempt to correct a large exchange rate misalignment. However, 
the political turmoil and the failure to effectively correct the misalignment brought 
remittances back to very low levels in the last months of 1979.  Yearly figures show a 
recovery of remittances in 1979, but such recovery actually started only after the 1980 
program (Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992). We also see that remittance flows declined in the early 
1980’s, then stabilized in the second half of the 1980s, rose substantially in the second half of 
the 1990’s, but fell again in 1999.  
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Remittances have come to play a major role in the economies of the labor-sending countries. 
According to Russell (1986), the significance of that role is frequently underscored by 
calculation of remittances as a percentage of the macroeconomic indicators such as gross 
national product (GNP), or government expenditures. In addition, Russell (1986) argues that: 
“The most frequent and probably most meaningful comparison is with exports and imports, a 
comparison which stresses the relative contribution of remittances to foreign exchange 
earnings, the importance of the “labor export industry” and the role of remittances in a 
countries ability to pay the import bill.” Table 2.5 presents the data and ratios of workers’ 
remittances, GDP, exports and imports. According to Chandavarkar (1980), the magnitude of 
foreign remittances is understated in these figures. He indicates that the figures cover only 
cash remittances through official channels. Graphs 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 present the magnitude 
of workers’ remittances as percentage of exports, imports and GDP.         
 
2.5. Official Attitude of Turkish Government Towards Migrants and Remittances 
            
As noted earlier, the period between 1960 and 1980 has witnessed substantial political 
turmoil. In the years of a change in the Turkish government, it was observed that workers 
remit substantially less (see, Graph 2.8). In addition to this, changes in government also 
caused repeated changes in the official attitude towards the remittances. How these repeated 
changes in the government led to just as many repeated changes in the official attitude 
towards the remittances is described at length in Miller (1976), Etzinger (1978), Werth and 
Yalçıntaş (1978), Adler (1981), and in Penninx (1982).  
 
The Turkish Government has developed a number of policies to encourage migrants’ 
remittances, such as special exchange rates for remittances, “special interest rates” for the 
foreign currency accounts maintained by the Turks abroad with the Turkish Central Bank, 
and a program which permits Turks residing abroad to shorten their compulsory military 
service by paying a fee in foreign currency. In addition to these, Turkish migrants also 
enjoyed special import privileges for consumer goods and machinery. Since the late 1980s, 
returned migrants have had the right to buy consumer durables with foreign exchange at 
special “duty free” shops during the first six months after their return. (Martin, 1992) 
 
The special “preferential exchange rates” for emigrants’ remittances had been practiced in 
the 1960s, became abolished in 1970, and became valid again in April and May 1979. 
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 Turkey adopted a two-tiered exchange rate in May 1979, which did increase remittances for 
a short time, and then devalued the Turkish Lira in 1980, which once again increased 
remittances. 
 
Since 1976, Turkey has had a foreign exchange deposit program, which offers premium 
interest rates on foreign currency accounts (e.g. 11 per cent on one-year US dollar accounts 
in 1988). These premium-interest foreign currency accounts, mostly in DM, with the Turkish 
Central Bank attracted US$ 4 billion in savings by 1988, but according to Martin (1992) this 
has a cost to Turkey because the interest rate premium represents a subsidy to savers. Today 
two types of accounts are available for migrants: “Foreign Currency Deposit Accounts with 
Credit Letter” and “Super FX Accounts”. As of April 2002, foreign currency deposit 
accounts with credit letter offer 4% premium interest for one-year time deposits of US$ and 
Euro, and annually 5% interest rate is offered for two-years time deposits. On the other hand, 
super foreign exchange accounts offer 8% interest rate for one-year time deposits, 9% 
annually for two-year time deposits and 10% annually for three-year time deposits. 
 
The Turkish Government in the 1970s also tried to channel remittance savings into 
employment generating activities in order to maximize economic growth. In Turkey such 
governmental channeling of remittances included programs, which made Turkish Lira loans 
for homes, farms and small business contingent on migrants establishing foreign currency 
savings accounts with one of the designated Turkish banks. Migrants wanting to return with 
cars, trucks and professional equipment were also required to open foreign currency savings 
accounts. But, according to Abadan-Ünat (1986), such programs to channel remittances into 
government approved investments failed to attract many migrant applicants, in part because 
the private sector offered attractive savings alternatives. One government housing program 
required that 40 per cent of the housing loan be deposited in a foreign currency account for 
three years. Housing co-operatives, by contrast, offered low interest 20-year mortgages. 
These mortgages were backed by the Turkish Government in exchange for relatively small 
down payments and monthly installment payments during the three to five years of 
construction. This alternative was a good opportunity for migrants abroad (see, Martin, 
1992). 
Turkey established two unique development programs linked to migration. One is the Village 
Development Cooperatives (VDCs), which were initiated in 1962 both to help rural 
development and to give priority to members who wished to migrate abroad for employment. 
During the early 1960s, persons joining a VDC had to pay a membership fee, and the 1000 
TL down payment was soon accepted as the fee, which had to be paid to emigrate. The 
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number of VDCs and their membership exploded in the mid-1960s but, according to 
Abadan-Ünat (1986), this VDC expansion was “solely to assure (VDC) members priority in 
finding work in Europe” (p.356). Abadan-Ünat (1986)’s evaluation of VDCs suggests that 
they failed to help rural development because their major purpose was to help members to 
jump ahead in the emigration queue, not to increase development projects. In addition, some 
migrants paid only part of their VDC fee before they went abroad and, once abroad, they 
failed to pay the rest of the fee, so that most VDCs had very limited resources to help 
development. 
 
The second Turkish institution developed to channel migrant remittances was the Turkish 
Workers Company (TWC). TWCs are Turkish corporations established by migrant savings. 
Migrants exchange their savings for stock in TWCs, which tend to be small enterprises 
(usually fewer than 100 employees), located in the area of origin of the migrant-investors. 
Although the exact number of TWCs and their employment is not certain, about 360 were 
“founded” and about 200 were incorporated, but only about 100 actually constructed a 
facility to produce a good or service. There were 27 of these in 1975; the 10 most established 
firms had 20 thousand shareholders and one thousand employees. (Swamy, 1981) In the 
early 1980s just about 80 TWCs with an employment of 11 thousand were operating. 
(Abadan-Ünat, 1986) 
 
TWCs in the late 1980s tended to fall into one of three groups: those that opened and failed; 
those that opened, ran into trouble and were “rehabilitated” by a special Turkish bank and 
provincial authorities; and those that proved successful enough to abandon their migrant 
shareholder roots. Most TWCs fall in the first group (Abadan-Ünat, 1986). 
 
All of the TWC complained about the Turkish bureaucracy and the declining value of the 
Turkish lira, which had devalued their savings and investment plans. Until 1981, when 
Turkey introduced foreign currency accounts in Turkey, migrant workers were required to 
convert their foreign currency savings into Lira within 30 days of their permanent return. 
This currency conversion was not a major issue until 1977-1978, when the value of the lira 
began declining rapidly. A Turkish worker who converted his DM savings at the rate of DM1 
= 8 TL in 1977 could have obtained 12 TL for each DM a year later, 17 TL in 1979, and 42 
TL in 1980. (Martin, 1992) 
 
When the labor demand in Western Europe suddenly decreased in the beginning of 1970s, in 
order to promote the departure of migrants, bilateral credit programs and some other 
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programs were applied. But these programs have failed to attract many participants. An 
agreement, dating 1972, between the Federal Republic of Germany and Turkey made 
German funds available to returning Turkish migrants who wished to open a small business 
in Turkey, provided that the migrant participated in training programs in both the Federal 
Republic of Germany and Turkey. One analysis of such reintegration programs begun by 
host nations to promote returns concluded that they were too complicated and too costly for 
host governments and not attractive enough to encourage migrant participation. (Martin, 
1992) 
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CHAPTER 3:     REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In this section we first present methods for modeling international workers’ remittances and 
determinants of remittances according to these methods. Secondly, a simple taxonomy of 
remittances will be given in order to understand the remitting behavior of workers. Thirdly, 
determinants of remittances regarding the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants and 
their families will be briefly presented. Fourthly, macroeconomic determinants of 
remittances will be discussed in depth. Impacts of economic activity, stock of workers, wage 
rates, relative rates of returns, exchange rate premium, institutional environment, political 
instability, inconsistent government policies, domestic inflation and exchange rate 
misalignment will be analyzed. Finally, the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the 
macroeconomic determinants of workers’ remittances will be summarized.   
      
3.1. Methods for Modeling International Workers' Remittances and Determinants of 
Remittances According to These Methods: 
 
Methods for modeling international workers' remittances are mainly classified into two 
categories (Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992). One category treats workers’ remittances as an 
endogenous variable in the process of decision making on migration and remittances within 
the family (see, e.g. Knowles and Anker [1981], Lucas and Stark [1985], Russell [1986], 
Taylor [1992], Ilahi and Jafarey [1998]). The other category models it as a transfer of saving 
from one region to another and in this approach mainly portfolio considerations are 
emphasized (see, e.g. Chandavarkar [1980], Wahba [1991], El-Sakka and Mcnabb [1999]).  
 
The determinants of workers’ remittances are also grouped into two according to the 
following two approaches (Russell, 1986). The determinants of workers’ remittances under 
the first tradition mostly includes variables regarding the sociodemographic characteristics of 
migrants and their families, such as the marital status of migrant, number of children of the 
family of migrant; years of education of migrant and the family and the employment status of 
other family members, occupational level of migrant, etc. The second approach, however 
mainly considers macroeconomic and political variables as well as variables related with the 
institutional environment. 
 
Determinants of remittances regarding the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants and 
their families have been the main focus of many of the studies in the literature (see, for  
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example, Knowles and Anker, 1981; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Hoddinott, 1992). Much of the 
literature, however, has concentrated on individuals’ motives to remit rather than on the 
macroeconomic variables that may influence the flow of migrants’ savings to their countries 
of origin. While many of the earlier empirical work consistently find significant influence on 
remittances of the sociodemographic characteristics of migrants and their families, some of 
them fail to find any significant effects of macroeconomic variables and incentive policies 
(see, for example, Swamy, 1981; Straubhaar, 1986; Glytsos, 1988). Hence, the question of 
whether remittance flows are responsive to macroeconomic variables has not been 
sufficiently explored.  
 
3.2. A Simple Taxonomy of Remittances  
 
In order to achieve a full understanding of the remittance behavior of migrant workers and 
the determinants of the level of remittances, the following simple taxonomy of remittances 
given in Wahba (1991) is important: First class of workers’ remittances is the “Potential 
Remittances” which are the savings available to the migrant once all his expenses are met in 
the host economy. These represent the maximum amount a migrant can remit. Second class 
is the “Fixed Remittances” that represent the minimum amount a migrant sends to satisfy his 
family’s basic needs. The third class is the “Discretionary Remittances”, they are what the 
worker remits over and above the fixed amount sent either through official or unofficial 
channels. Finally “Saved Remittances”, or retained savings, are the amount not remitted. 
They are represented by the difference between total savings and actual remittances in that 
period. 
 
3.3. Determinants of Remittances Regarding the Sociodemographic Characteristics of 
Migrants and Their Families 
 
Now let us give a brief review of the literature on determinants of remittances regarding the 
sociodemographic characteristics of migrants and their families. According to Russell (1986) 
the potential determinants of remittances in this approach are ratio of females in population 
in host country, years since worker has out migrated, household income level, employment 
of other household members, marital status of the migrant, years of education of the migrant 
and occupational level of migrants. Ilahi and Jafarey (1998) also add variables like the 
number of children and their educational position, and pre-migration economic situation.  
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The literature in this field is also divided into two main approaches. According to the first 
approach, the ability to remit is directly linked to the wage received in the host country and 
the migrant saving behavior, among other factors. This suggests a sequential decision 
process, where an aggregate level of savings is determined before the share to be remitted to 
the home country. There is a class of models that centers the analysis in the determination of 
the migrant worker's savings function. In these models, the migrant is seen as the traditional 
macroeconomic agent maximizing intertemporal utility to generate a savings-consumption 
path, both at home and abroad (e.g. Djajic [1989]; Djajic and Milbourne [1988]). However, 
the migrant's program is more complex than the standard savings program, since he needs to 
account for information on foreign relative prices, wages and interest rate paths, in addition 
to his length of stay abroad.  
 
The second approach, on the other hand, treats remittances as an intertemporal contractual 
agreement between the migrant and his family. The exact terms of the contract are defined by 
the relative bargaining powers of the parties involved. Stark (1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985b, 
1987a) is the main contributor to this literature. In order to give some insight into the second 
approach, let us present three explanations for why migrants remit parts of their incomes to 
their families at home. According to Lucas and Stark (1985), first, migrants may remit for 
purely altruistic reasons in order to increase the well being of family members at home by 
providing additional income and thus, higher consumption levels. Second, migrants may 
remit part of their savings for motives of self-interest to be used to finance the purchase of 
durable goods, real and financial assets and/or investment at home. Third, remittances can be 
seen as part of a mutually beneficial arrangement between the migrant and his family at 
home. 
 
3.4. Macroeconomic Determinants of Remittances 
 
We now turn to the discussion in the literature on the macroeconomic aspect of determinants 
of workers’ remittances. Russell (1986) lists some potential determinants of remittances in 
this approach as number of workers, wage rates, economic activity in host and sending 
countries, exchange rate, relative interest rate between labor sending and receiving countries, 
political risk factors in sending country and facility of transferring funds. 
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3.4.1. Impact of Economic Activity, Stock of Workers and Wage Rates 
 
The impact of economic activity, real earnings of workers and total number of workers in the 
host country were consistently found to be significant and positively affecting the flow of 
remittances in the literature. (e.g. Swamy [1981], Straubhaar [1986], Elbadawi and Rocha 
[1992], El-Sakka and Mcnabb [1999])  
 
According to Swamy (1981), the number of migrants abroad and their wages explain over 
90% of the variation in remittance inflows. The author also adds that most of the variation 
was due to the number of workers abroad. Since, the numbers of workers in the host country 
and wage rates are both related to the levels of economic activity, both in the host country 
and in the labor-sending country, Swamy (1981) also examines fluctuations in remittances in 
relation to the fluctuations in GDP. He finds that the level of, and cyclical fluctuations in, 
economic activity in the host countries explained 70 to 90% of the variation in the 
remittances. This result may be due to the fact that changes in these macroeconomic 
indicators reflect changes in the demand for migrant workers and possible changes in their 
wage rates. 
 
El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) note that the general finding that the level of economic activity 
in host countries has an impact on remittance flows is further supported in their analysis. The 
level of real earnings available to migrants in the host countries where they work is found to 
have a significant positive effect on the inflow of remittances though it appears that the 
impact takes some time to work through. The level of real domestic income, in contrast, does 
appear to influence the flow of remittance earnings irrespective of whether it enters the 
model in its current or lagged form. Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) also conclude that the flow 
of remittances to labor-exporting countries in North Africa and Europe is positively 
correlated with the number of nationals working abroad and income in the host countries. 
 
3.4.2. Impact of Relative Rates of Returns and Exchange Rate Premium 
 
On the other hand, the impact of relative rates of return, exchange rate premium, domestic 
income and inflation and economic risk factors are rather mixed. Swamy (1981) was one of 
the most influential studies in this field that focus upon identifying and measuring the 
determinants of remittances systematically. In this study, Swamy constructs a simple model 
of remittances that contains major potential determinants as the "incentive" interest rates on 
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foreign currency deposits in the sending country relative to the interest rate on comparable 
maturity deposits in the receiving countries, the difference between the preferential exchange 
rate for remittances and the official exchange rate in the home country, the rate of real return 
on real estate in the home country relative to comparable rate of real return on bank deposits 
in the receiving countries and the difference between the black market exchange rate and the 
official exchange rate (the black market premium) in the home country, in addition to the 
classical variables of economic activities, wage rates and number of workers. By this model 
Swamy (1981) also tests the effectiveness of government policies on workers’ remittances by 
using the first two variables, since they represent the special incentive schemes introduced by 
governments of labor-sending countries to increase the flow of workers’ remittances through 
official channels. Swamy tests the model using data from Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia 
and concludes that the "incentive" interest rates in the sending country relative to the interest 
rate in the receiving countries, the difference between the preferential exchange rate and the 
official exchange rate in the home country, the rate of real return on real estate in the home 
country relative to the rate of real return of the receiving countries, the difference between 
the black market exchange rate and the official exchange rate, the black market premium, in 
the home country were not found to affect total remittance flows significantly. Since 
governments of labor-exporting countries introduced such special incentive schemes to 
increase the flow of workers’ remittances through official channels, Swamy’s results 
question the use of such policies. 
 
Straubhaar (1986) develops a simple model to examine the remittances of Turkish workers in 
Germany. The model is tested through a reduced form equation in which the flow of 
remittances is a function of the deviation of the official exchange rate from the one defined 
by a purchasing power parity equilibrium between Turkey and Germany, the difference 
between expected real rate of returns to investment in the home and the host country, the 
stock of Turkish workers in Germany, and their wages. Following Swamy (1981)’s 
conclusions, Straubhaar (1986) argues that: “Contrary to conventional belief, the incentives 
to attract emigrants’ remittances have not been very successful. Neither variation in 
exchange rates, reflecting the governmental intention to attract remittances by premium 
exchange rates, nor changes in the real return of investments (reflecting the governmental 
intention to attract remittances by foreign exchange deposits with higher returns) affect the 
flows of remittances towards Turkey.” He concludes that, the flows of remittances towards 
Turkey are determined, in order of importance: first, by the economic situation in Germany, 
the wage levels in Germany and possibility for Turkish emigrants to become active have  
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determined the potential flow of remittances. What part of this potential flow has been really 
remitted was determined by the second, the confidence the Turkish emigrants felt in the 
safety and liquidity of their investments in their country of origin. The workers’ propensity to 
remit might have been determined finally by a third factor, economic incentives making an 
investment in Turkey more beneficial than investments in other countries. 
 
Following Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar (1986)’s conclusions, Glytsos (1988) argues that 
the variables related with the socio-demographic and income factors are the long-run 
determinants of remittances. Regarding the macroeconomic variables and policy, he argues 
that they only have short-run effect and they only shift remittances around the long-run trend. 
 
In contrast with Glytsos (1988), Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) argue that macroeconomic 
policies in the labor-exporting country may, however, influence the choice of the channel of 
transfer i.e. the official versus unofficial channels. Furthermore, it is argued that as average 
age of the stock of migrants increase, the "required" component of remittances, which is 
mostly related with the family characteristics, declines and becomes relatively less important. 
This means that the short-run versus long-run effects between the two sets of influences is 
not as straightforward as suggested by Glytsos (1988). Since actual remittances data reflect 
both "required" components and the "desired" components, and since the desired component 
is mostly related with the portfolio considerations, any empirical model that give meaningful 
policy implications must account for the determinants of both concepts. 
 
Wahba (1991), in the study of remittances over the period of 1974-1989, examines the 
Egyptian case against the decline of the growth of remittances to countries in the Middle 
East. He also develops a theoretical framework for analysis of such flows. Regarding the 
interest rate differentials, Wahba (1991) states that the flow of discretionary remittances is 
determined primarily by the difference between the real domestic interest rate and the real 
foreign interest rate. Furthermore, for these remittances to flow through official channels the 
exchange rate difference must be greater than the cost of going to the parallel market. As an 
example he indicates that: “Islamic companies established in Egypt in the early 1980s were 
offering returns on deposits of approximately 24% in nominal terms compared to 13.25 
percent on ten year Egyptian government bonds. It is estimated that by 1987 these companies 
had accumulated deposits of $9 billion from workers abroad, tempted by the high domestic 
interest rates. These remittances, for the most part, went through unofficial channels.”   
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Katseli and Glytsos (1986) find that per capita remittances are positively related to interest 
rates in the host country. The home interest rate is significant with a negative sign but 
becomes insignificant when domestic inflation is introduced, suggesting that the home 
interest rate and domestic inflation are positively correlated. 
 
3.4.3. Impact of Institutional Environment  
 
Regarding the importance of institutional environment Chandavarkar (1980) states that: 
“Realistic rates of exchange and facilities for holding remittances in foreign currency 
accounts, with banks in the countries of origin, are useful incentives that have been widely 
used by governments of labor-sending countries for attracting migrants’ funds.”  
 
According to Wahba (1991) the availability of financial intermediation is one of most 
important factors affecting the flow of remittances. He indicates that many workers use the 
parallel market because of absence of a more efficient channel of transfer. He adds that 53% 
of migrants from rural areas in Egypt used friends, relations, or both, as a means of 
transferring their remittances to Egypt, because of the absence of official channels. So, 
absence of official channels is an important factor that reduces the volume of remittances. 
 
3.4.4. Impact of Official versus Unofficial Channels 
 
Another important factor affecting the level of recorded remittances is clearly the channel 
used to remit. Workers can send their remittances to their country of origin through official 
or unofficial channels. According to many studies the volume of unofficial remittances is 
substantial in many labor-exporting countries. For example, in Sudan, only 24 percent of 
migrants surveyed used official banking channels. (Serageldin et. al. (1981))  
 
The options of workers as unofficial channels are given in Russell (1986) as postal money 
orders, private money changers or other agents, transfer through foreign corporate 
employers, and various mechanisms by which funds are hand-carried back to the country of 
origin- by the migrant during visits, by friends or trusted agents.   
 
Wahba (1991), regarding the workers’ choice of the use of a channel, argues that whether the 
workers send their fixed remittances through the official or the unofficial market will depend 
on the difference between the official exchange rate and the parallel (or black market) rate,  
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and the cost of going through the unofficial market. This cost is related with the search for a 
means of sending the remittances and the worker’s willingness of the risk in using the 
unofficial channels. 
 
3.4.5. Impact of Political Instability and Inconsistent Government Policies 
 
The effects of political instability and inconsistent government policies on workers’ 
remittances were also analyzed in Wahba(1991)’s study. He argues that political instability 
in the home country does not appear to affect the flow of fixed remittances, that the migrant 
has to send in order to satisfy the family’s basic needs; but will affect the flow of 
discretionary remittances, which are more related with the portfolio considerations. 
Regarding the inconsistent government policies, (e.g. a temporary ban on imported goods), 
he argues that it can reduce the demand for foreign currency, thus cutting the parallel market 
premium. Thus he concludes that the greater the variance in the government’s policies the 
less will be the migrant’s willingness to use official channels. 
 
After these observations, some policy options for governments were given in Wahba 
(1991)’s study as follows: firstly, when a parallel market exists and the government wishes to 
increase the flow of recorded remittances, it could devalue its exchange rate. Devaluation 
will reduce the difference between the parallel and official rates and will make it attractive 
for workers to remit through official channels, irrespective of the interest rate structure. 
Secondly, sufficiently increasing domestic interest rates relative to those in the host country 
will increase attractiveness of investment in home country. Finally, higher penalties for those 
caught operating in the black market may prevent some workers from sending their money 
through unofficial channels.  
 
3.4.6. Impact of Domestic Inflation 
 
In El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) domestic inflation is found to have a positive and significant 
impact on the inflow of remittances. According to the authors, this may reflect the need to 
boost family support in times of rising prices. An alternative explanation is that migrants 
remit more of their earnings during periods of inflation to purchase real assets, such as land 
and jewellery, the real value of which may be constant or actually rising in times of inflation. 
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On the other hand, Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) argue that a high inflation should lead to 
lower official remittances since it reflect increased risk and uncertainty. They also note that 
since the premium is directly related to the market for remittances, it should have a greater 
impact on remittances than domestic inflation. Katseli and Glytsos (1986) also argue that 
remittances are negatively related to inflation rates in the home country. 
 
3.4.7. Impact of Exchange Rate Misalignments 
 
Regarding the impact of exchange rate misalignment Chandavarkar (1980) argue that: 
“Given a congenial legal and political milieu, clearly the most important macroeconomic 
requisite for inducing remittances through official channels is a realistic unitary (single) rate 
of exchange for the currency of the labor exporting country. Remittances are notably 
sensitive to any indications of currency overvaluation and are prone to slow down in such 
cases, leading to widespread resort to unofficial channels to transfer funds.”  
 
Following Chandavarkar (1980)’s conclusion, Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) indicate that large 
exchange rate misalignments can change the direction of a substantial volume of remittances 
away from official channels and towards parallel markets and they add that the existence of 
incentives, such as preferential interest rates or exchange rates may not prevent this result.  
 
To summarize, the impact of economic activity; real earnings of workers; and total number 
of workers in the host country were consistently found to be significant and positive on the 
flow of remittances. However, the evidence on the impact of relative rates of return, 
exchange rate premium, domestic income and inflation is rather mixed. Russell (1986) 
argues that the existence of necessary facilities for transferring funds and economic activity 
in sending country positively affect the remittance flow. Likewise, political risk factors in 
sending country negatively affect the remittance flow. But, the effect of exchange rate and 
relative interest rate between labor-sending and receiving countries is rather mixed according 
to Russell (1986). On the one hand, Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986) and Glytsos (1988)  
all argue that neither interest rate differentials between the host and home countries nor 
variation in exchange rates have any effect on remittance flows. In contrast, Katseli and 
Glytsos (1986) find per capita remittances to be related to the foreign interest rate. Also they 
found significant negative effect of domestic inflation on the flow of remittances. According 
to Chandavarkar (1980), both realistic exchange rates and existence of necessary institutional 
environment significantly affect remittances. Wahba (1991) also indicate that black market  
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premium of exchange rates, interest rate differentials, political instability and inconsistent 
government policies and also necessary financial intermediation all significantly affect the 
flow of remittances. While El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) and Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) 
agree on the negative effect of the black market premium, they disagree on the effect of 
differential interest rate and domestic inflation. According to Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), 
differential between domestic and foreign interest rates has no significant effect on 
remittances, while El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) argue that it negatively affect the 
remittances. Also Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) argue that domestic inflation negatively affect 
the remittance flow, while El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) argue that it positively affect the 
remittances. Hence, there is still, an ongoing debate on the effect of some potential 
determinants of remittances. 
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CHAPTER 4:     ECONOMIC MODELLING 
 
We hypothesize that, at the macroeconomic level, conditions in the host country and the home 
country both affect the flow of remittances. So, the economic modeling of workers’ 
remittances will require that we consider both the conditions in the host country and the 
country of origin. In view of the literature, the variables we consider in our model are: the 
level of economic activity in host and home countries, interest rate differentials, black market 
premium, domestic rate of inflation and growth, real overvaluation and state of government.  
Due to lack of data, we couldn’t use the incentive values of interest rates and exchange rates 
that are available to the migrant workers. Level of economic activity in the country of origin, 
domestic rate of inflation and domestic rate of growth are variables that are related, but we 
will question the significance and direction of their impact. The chapter follows discussing the 
potential determinants of workers’ remittances and their expected impact. Then, according to 
these arguments equations that are used to model remittances are presented. 
 
4.1. HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE IMPACT OF VARIABLES  
(i) Level of economic activity in the host country 
Looking initially to the host country, most important variable that influence the level of 
remittances identified in the earlier studies (see, e.g., Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986), 
Elbadawi and Rocha (1992)) is the level of economic activity in the host country. Level of 
economic activity in the host country affects the level of remittances through two channels: 
firstly, level of economic activity directly affects the demand for migrant labor. The countries 
that import labor generally set quotas that limit the number of migrant workers and the 
duration that they can remain in the host country and these quotas adjust accordingly with the 
level of economic activity in the host country. Secondly, the economic activity in the host 
country will affect the level of wages of the migrant workers. Since the wage level of the 
migrant workers will determine their consumption and saving patterns, it will also determine 
the potential amount that the worker can remit. Both two channels indicate that the level of 
economic activity in the host country positively affect the level of remittances. 
(ii) Stock of workers abroad  
Total stock of workers abroad is obviously one of the variables that most significantly affect 
the level of remittances to the country of origin. In the Turkish case, as the number of workers 
in the host countries increase, the inflow of the remittances also increased historically. Also, 
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stock of workers is found to have a positive and significant impact on the level of remittances 
in all the previous studies. (see, e.g., Swamy (1981), Straubhaar (1986), Elbadawi and Rocha 
(1992))   
(iii) Interest differentials 
Migrant workers also use their remittances to finance financial or real investments. If domestic 
rates of return are low compared with those in the host country, migrants will prefer to keep 
their savings abroad. So, it is expected that the larger the premium of domestic rates over 
foreign ones, the more will the workers sent their savings to home. Because of this reason, 
most labor exporting countries offered foreign exchange accounts with premium interest rates 
to their migrant workers abroad. 
(iv) Black market premium 
Workers’ remittances are a major source of foreign exchange for countries that are exporting 
their labor. In many of these countries, exchange rates are pegged in levels that differ 
significantly from the market rates. This causes an overvaluation and excess demand of the 
foreign currency. In the countries where a black market or parallel market of foreign exchange 
is active, migrant workers have the option to exchange their remittances through official 
channels or unofficial channels, namely the black market. Black market premium is the 
percentage difference between the black market rate and the official rate of foreign exchange. 
The more significant the black market premium, the more will be the amount of remittances 
channeled to the black market. The remittances may also be channeled to the black market 
because of a taxation applied to the foreign exchange transferred through the official channels. 
But, governments may also impose some penalties to the people involved in the black market, 
which will increase the cost of using unofficial channels.     
(v) Level of economic activity in the country of origin 
According to one school of thought since family support is an important reason for migration, 
it is expected that workers will remit more of their earnings to their home country the lower 
the average level of income in the country of origin. (El-Sakka and Mcnabb, 1999) But, this 
explanation is valid for “Fixed Remittances” that represent the minimum amount a migrant 
sends to satisfy his family’s basic needs. The “Discretionary Remittances”, which represent 
the remittances worker remits over and above the fixed amount, will be mostly related with 
the portfolio considerations. From this point of view, a low level of real economic activity in  
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the country of origin may also be an indicator of economic and/or political instability or crises. 
So, a low level of domestic income may also decrease the amount of remittances. 
     
(vi) Domestic inflation 
Domestic inflation can affect remittance flows through its impact on domestic real income and 
the purchasing power of worker’s family in the country of origin. The impact of inflation 
according to this view will be positive because, in periods of high inflation the workers will 
remit more in order to maintain family consumption levels at home. (El-Sakka and Mcnabb, 
1999)  According to another point of view, a high rate of inflation is a sign of economic, and 
possibly political, instability. (Elbadawi and Rocha, 1992) So, a high rate of domestic inflation 
can be a proxy for uncertainty and risk. The impact of inflation in this case will be negative. 
An alternative view is that migrants remit more in periods of high inflation to purchase real 
assets, because real value of these assets are constant or rising in these periods. (El-Sakka and 
Mcnabb, 1999)     
(vii) Domestic growth 
From our point of view, rate of growth in the country of origin is a good indicator of the 
economic situation in the country. A low rate of growth in the country of origin may represent 
a high level of economic risk, so negatively affecting the level of remittances. The 
considerations regarding the family support may also be valid for the domestic rate of growth.    
(viii) Real overvaluation  
Exchange rate misalignments in the home country will divert the remittances from the official 
market to the black market, if a black market exists. Because of this reason, the impact of real 
overvaluation is parallel with the impact of the black market premium. If there is no black 
market in the country of origin, workers may prefer to keep their savings abroad. So, the more 
the domestic currency is overvalued, the less will the migrant workers’ remittances.   
(ix) Military administration  
Periods of military administration in the country of origin represent a political change in the 
home country. If military administration period is a period of political and economic 
instability, the level of remittances will decrease. But, it may affect the level of remittances 
positively if workers confidence to the administration increases in these periods. 
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4.2. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
When we perform the unit root tests of the variables, it turned out that all the variables were I 
(1), except for the growth rate and extra government dummy (see, section 6.2 for details on 
unit root tests). So, we used models with the first differences of I(1) variables. Variables with 
initial “D” are the first differences of variables. 
Model 1: First difference of remittances model 
Based on the discussion above, the total flow of cash remittances can be represented by the 
following equation in log form, where, “Rem” represent the cash remittance inflows, 
“Worker” is the total stock of Turkish workers abroad, “Yhost” is the host country GDP per 
capita, “Ydom” is the domestic GDP per capita, “Bmp” is the black market premium, “Rov” is 
the real overvaluation, “Intdif” is the interest differential between the country of origin and the 
host country, “Inflation” is the domestic annual CPI inflation, “Growth” is the domestic GDP 
growth rate and “Exgovdum” is the dummy variable representing the periods of military 
administration. Data for these variables are available in Table 4.1.     
DLogRemt = C1 + C2 * DLogWorkert + C3 * DLogYhostt + C4  * 
DLogYdomt+ C5 * DBmpt + C6 * DRovt + C7 * DIntdift + C8 * DInflationt + 
C9 * Growtht + C10 * Exgovdumt + ε1t 
 
Model 2: First difference of per worker remittances model 
An alternative way of modeling remittances is using per worker instead of level remittances. 
According to Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) per worker regressions perform better than level 
regressions of remittances. So, as an alternative model we also used the first difference of per 
worker remittances as dependent variable.   
DLogRempwt = C1 + C2 * DLogYhostt + C3  * DLogYdomt+ C4 * DBmpt + 
C5 * DRovt + C6 * DIntdift + C7 * DInflationt + C8 * Growtht + C9 * 
Exgovdumt + ε1t 
where different from the model above, “Rempw” represent remittances per worker. Stock of 
workers is not included in this equation since it is considered with the per worker remittances. 
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CHAPTER 5:     ECONOMETRIC THEORY 
 
In this chapter we review the econometric theory that is used in this study. Firstly, stationarity 
and test for unit root issues are discussed. Then, diagnostic tests that are used to evaluate the 
estimations are presented.  
 
5.1. STATIONARITY and TEST FOR UNIT ROOT 
Unit root tests are important in examining the stationarity of a time series. Stationarity is a 
matter of concern in three important areas. First, a crucial question in the ARIMA modeling of 
a single time series is the number of times the series needs to be first differenced before an 
ARMA model is fit. Each unit root requires a first differencing operation. Second, stationarity 
of regressors is assumed in the derivation of standard inference procedures for regression 
models. Nonstationary regressors invalidate many standard results and require special 
treatment. Third, in cointegration analysis, an important question is whether the disturbance 
term in the cointegrating vector has a unit root. 
 
The ADF (Augmented Dickey-Fuller) test consists in running a regression of the first 
difference of the series against the series lagged once, lagged difference terms, and optionally, 
a constant and a time trend. With two lagged difference terms, the regression is:  
                          (1) 
 
There are three choices in running the 
ADF test regression. One is whether to include a constant term in the regression. Another is 
whether to include a linear time trend. The third is how many lagged differences are to be 
included in the regression. In each case the test for a unit root is a test on the coefficient of yt-1 
in the regression. If the coefficient is significantly different from zero then the hypothesis that 
y contains a unit root is rejected and the hypothesis is accepted that y is stationary rather than 
integrated. 
 
If the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic is smaller (in absolute value) than the reported critical values, 
you cannot reject the hypothesis of nonstationarity and the existence of a unit root. You would 
conclude that your series may not be stationary. You may then wish to test whether the series 
is I(1) (integrated of order one) or integrated of a higher order. A series is I(1) if its first 
difference does not contain a unit root. You can repeat the ADF test on the first difference of 
∆yt  =  β1 yt-1 + β2 ∆yt-1 + β3 ∆yt-2 + β4 + β5 t             
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your series to test the hypothesis of integration of order 1 against higher orders. You can 
repeat the test on second differences if you find that the first difference may be non-stationary. 
 
5.2. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING 
5.2.1. Chow Tests  
The test of parameter constancy has the form of a Chow (1960) test:  
h= 
( RSST-RSST1) /( T-T1) 
 
RSST1/(T1-k)  
app
~
   F( T-T1,T1-k) on H0 
 
 
(2) 
where H0 is parameter constancy. In (2), RSS T is the full-sample residual sum of squares, 
RSST1 is for the relevant sub-sample, where T represents number of observations and there are 
k regressors. For fixed regressors, the Chow (1960) test is exactly distributed as an F, but is 
only approximately (or asymptotically) so in dynamic models.  
The (Chow) test of parameter constancy out-of-sample has the form:  
h= 
( RSST+H-RSST) /H 
 
RSST/(T-k)  
app
~
   F( H,T-k) on H0 
 
 
(3) 
where H0 is parameter constancy.     
5.2.2. Normality 
This is a test for whether the skewness and kurtosis of the residuals correspond to that of a 
normal distribution (see, Doornik and Hansen [1994]). For a variable xt, let µ and σx2 
denote its mean and variance, and write µi=E[ xt-µ] i, so that σx2=µ2 . The skewness and 
kurtosis are defined respectively as:  
√β1= 
µ3 
 
µ23/2  
and β2= 
µ4 
 
µ22  
. 
 
 
(4) 
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A normal variate has √β1=0 and β2=3.Sample estimates of these four parameters are given 
by  
x= 1/T ∑t=1Txt,    mi= 1/T ∑t=1T( xt-x) 
i,    √b1= 
m3 
 
m23/2  
and 
b2= 
m4 
 
m22  
. 
 
 
(5) 
Bowman and Shenton (1975) consider a χ2( 2) test based on √b1 and b2, but emphasize 
that it is unsuitable unless the sample size is very large: the statistics √b1 and b2 are not 
independently distributed, and the sample kurtosis approaches normality very slowly (see 
Shenton and Bowman, [1977], and D'Agostino, [1970]). Instead, let z1 and z2 denote 
transformations of skewness and kurtosis, designed to make these statistics closer to the 
standard normal. The resulting test is (see Doornik and Hansen, [1994]):  
z12+z22 app~ χ2( 2) .  
 
(6) 
Applied to residuals, this test gives appropriate rejection frequencies under the null of 
normality, using 2(2) critical values. (The null hypothesis is normality, which will be 
rejected at (e.g.) the 5%level if a test statistic of more than 5.99 is observed.)  
5.2.3. Error autocorrelation  
This is a Lagrange-multiplier (LM) test for rth-order residual autocorrelation, distributed as 
χ2( r) in large samples, under the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation (that is, that 
the errors are white noise): 
 
,with εt~IID(0,s2) and p, r represent lag numbers. The F-test is performed by an auxiliary 
regression of the residuals on the original variables and lagged residuals (missing lagged 
residuals at the start of the sample are replaced by zero, so no observations are lost). The null 
hypothesis will be rejected if the test statistic is too high. This LM test is valid for models with 
lagged dependent variables, whereas neither the DW nor the residual correlogram provide a 
valid test in that case.  
 
ut=∑i=prαiut-i+εt       ,where 0≤p≤r                                                     (7) 
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5.2.4. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
This is the ARCH (autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity test) which in its present form 
tests the hypothesis γ=0 in the model,(The null hypothesis is no ARCH, which would be 
rejected if the test statistic is too 
high):  
where γ=( γ1,...,γr) ' . Then TR2 from the regression of  t2 on a constant and  t-12 to 
u^t-r2 (called the ARCH test) is asymptotically distributed as χ2( r) on H0: γ=0: as usual, 
the F-form is reported. Both first-order and higher-order lag forms are easily calculated. (see, 
Engle [1982a]) 
5.2.5. Heteroscedasticity  
Tests if the {ut} have constant variance against the alternative that ut2 depends on the time-t 
original and squared regressors. The null hypothesis is no heteroscedasticity, which would be 
rejected if the test statistic is too high. The reported F-statistic is derived by an auxiliary 
regression of the squared residuals on a constant, the original regressors, and the original 
regressors squared.  
Table 5.1: Test Summary 
Test  Alternative  Statistic  Sources  
Chow(τT)  Predictive failure over a subset   Chow (1960, p.594-595), 
 of (1-τ) T obs. F((1-τ) T,τT-k)  Hendry (1979)  
normality test  Skewness and excess kurtosis  χ2(2)  Jarque and Bera (1980),  
   Doornik and Hansen (1994)  
AR 1-p test  p-th order residual autocorrelation  F(p,T-k-p)  Godfrey (1978),  
   Harvey (1981, p.173)  
ARCH 1-p test  p-th order autoregressive   Engle (1982b),  
 conditional heteroskedasticity  F(p,T-k-p)  Engle, Hendry and Trumbull (1985)  
hetero test  Heteroscedasticity quadratic   White (1980),  
 in regressors xi2  F(q,T-k-q-1)  Nicholls and Pagan (1983) 
1. There are T observations and k regressors in the model under the null. 
2. The value of q may differ across statistics, as may those of k and T across models. 
3. By default, PcGets sets p=4, r=12, and compute two Chow tests at τ1=[0.5T]/T and τ2=[0.9T]/T. 
E[ ut2ut-1,...,ut-r] =c0+∑i=1rγiut-i2                   (8) 
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CHAPTER 6:     DATA    
This chapter presents the data used in the estimations. Data periods, sources and construction 
of some variables are also given in this section. Results of unit root tests and the correlation 
matrix of variables are also analyzed in this chapter. The values of the variables were given in 
Table 4.1, the graphs of variables are also presented in the Appendix. 
  
6.1. SOURCES and CONSTRUCTION 
 
Workers’ Remittances (REM) are cash remittances of Turkish workers abroad that are sent 
via official channels. Data for remittances were available at the website and the bulletins of 
the Central Bank of Turkey for 1964-2001 period. Data is given in millions of current $USs. 
Graph 2.8 represents the development of cash remittance inflows to Turkey for 1964-2001 
period, where Graph 6.1 represents per worker remittances in the same period.     
 
Stock of workers abroad (WORKER) is the total stock of Turkish workers abroad. Data 
was available in Gökdere (1978) for 1964-1976 period and after 1981 data was available in 
the yearly reports of Ministry of Labor, Foreign Relations Department. For years 1977-1980 
we add the number of recruited workers in that year to the worker stock in the previous year. 
So data is available for 1964-2001 period and presented Table 6.1. Graph 6.2 represents the 
yearly figures of Turkish worker stock abroad, calculated by this methodology.  
 
Domestic country per capita income (YDOM) is the per capita GDP of Turkey. We used 
GDP at constant 1987 prices, in TL. In order to obtain per capita income, we divide this GDP 
value by the population. Data is available at the website of State Planning Institute (DPT), for 
1964-2001 period. Graph 6.5 represents yearly figures for Turkish GDP per capita with 1987 
prices. 
 
Host Country Representation: Eleven countries with biggest stock of Turkish workers are 
selected as host countries. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, England, France, 
Germany, Libya, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Republics of Former USSR. 
Till the unification of Germany, data represent the Federal Republic. In this study Republics 
of Former USSR is represented by a weighted average of Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Weights are assigned according 
to the stock of Turkish population in these countries. Stock of population in these countries is 
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available in the yearly reports of Ministry of Labor, Foreign Relations Department. The stock 
of workers in the host countries is again available in the yearly reports of Ministry of Labor, 
Foreign Relations Department after 1981. For the period 1964-1980 cumulative number of 
recruited workers is assumed to represent the stock of worker in that country. Weight of each 
host country is calculated then by dividing the stock of the country to the total stock of eleven 
countries. It turned out that assigning weights to countries by this method is a good 
representation of host countries. Weights of host countries are given in Table 6.2.  
 
Host country per capita income (YHOST) is the weighted average of per capita GDP in the 
host countries in current US$s. Data for per capita GDP in host countries is given in Table 
6.3. Weights are calculated as explained above. Per capita income in the host countries were 
obtained from the website of IMF and missing values were calculated by using GDP and 
population data from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Data is available for 
1964-2001 period. Graph 6.4 represents yearly figures.   
 
Black market premium (BMP) is defined as the percentage difference between the average 
yearly exchange rates of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the foreign currency in the official 
and parallel (black) markets. Data is obtained from the Global Development Network Growth 
Database of the World Bank available at the website of the bank. Data period is 1964-1999 
and values for years 1994 and 1995 are missing. So we could use this variable for 1964-1993 
period. Graph 6.3 represents the yearly figures.  
 
Real Overvaluation (ROV) is an index, which is the indicator of the currency (TL) real 
overvaluation in Turkey. Data is obtained from the Global Development Network Growth 
Database of the World Bank available at the website of the bank. Data period is 1964-1999. 
This variable is highly correlated with the black market premium, so we used them 
interchangeably. Graph 6.7 represents yearly figures of variable.          
 
Domestic Inflation (INFLATION) is the percentage variation of the yearly average Turkish 
CPI. Data is obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the period 
1964-2001. Graph 2.7 represents the yearly figures of variable. 
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Growth (GROWTH) is the percentage variation of the Turkish annual GDP in constant 1987 
prices. Data is available at the website of State Planning Institute (DPT), for 1964-2001 
period. Graph 6.6 represents yearly figures of variable. 
Interest rate differentials (INTDIF) was calculated as the weighted average of bilateral, 
depreciation-adjusted interest differentials on the yearly averages of deposit rates, following 
the methodology given in Elbadawi and Rocha (1992). The shares of stock of workers in each 
host country were again used as weights. If the deposit rate of a host country is not available 
for a year the weight of that country is distributed to other host countries for that year , 
proportional with the original weights of remaining host countries. Each bilateral interest 
differential, between Turkey (T) and host country (H), is defined as: 
 
IntdifTH = { { (1 + it ) / {(1 + Et) * (1 + it*)} } – 1 } 
      
where Et is the depreciation of the nominal bilateral exchange rate between t-1 and t, it is the 
domestic deposit rate at period t, and it* is the foreign deposit rate at t. Depreciation for the 
Euro Area countries for years 1999-2001 are calculated using Euro rates. Interest rates on 
deposits are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF for the period 
1978-2001 and are presented in Table 6.4; since, the deposit rate for the Federal Republic of 
Germany was available after 1978. Bilateral exchange rates were calculated from the national 
currency per US$ exchange rates of the countries. Exchange rates were also obtained from the 
IFS of the IMF and are available in Table 6.5. Depreciation rates are also given in Table 6.5. 
Graph 6.8 represents yearly figures of the variable. 
Military order dummy (EXGOVDUM) is the dummy representing that the military order is 
in force in Turkey. (1 for years with military order and 0 otherwise) Data for this variable is 
also available for 1964-2001 period. Finally, Graph 6.9 represents the yearly figures of data 
used in the estimations. 
6.2. CORRELATION MATRICES AND UNIT ROOT TESTS  
Firstly, we will look at the correlation matrix of the variables, included in models. Table 6.6 is 
the correlation matrix of variables included in models. According to this matrix, there is a 
high positive correlation between the first difference of domestic per capita income and 
domestic rate of growth, which is expected. Also, black market premium and real 
overvaluation are positively correlated. Real overvaluation is also negatively correlated with 
extra government dummy. These correlations are important because they may affect the 
direction and significance of the impact of variables. 
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The unit root tests of the variables indicate that variables other than extra government dummy 
and growth were all integrated order one, namely I (1). The results of the unit root tests are 
given in Table 6.7. Variables starting with “D” indicate the first difference of the original 
variable. So, we need to take the first difference of I (1) variables to achieve stationarity, 
which we need for a meaningful regression. 
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CHAPTER 7:     EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section reviews the results of regressions that are based on Models 1 and 2, presented in 
Chapter 4. Descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests of equations are also evaluated in this 
chapter. Dependent variables that are used in these models are the first difference of the 
logarithm of remittances and the first difference of the logarithm of remittances per worker, 
respectively. In these two models we use the first difference of variables, which turned out to 
be nonstationary in the unit root tests. We also estimated models with levels of variables but 
the results were not conclusive and economically unmeaningful, so we do not report those 
results.  Using Model 1 and Model 2, we carried out regressions for various periods. The 
changes in the estimation periods are based on data that are not available for the whole 
period of study. Diagnostic tests of these equations are also evaluated in this chapter. 
Equations for Model 1 and Model 2 are given in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, respectively.  
Diagnostic test results and descriptive statistics of equations for Model 1 and Model 2 are 
also given in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, respectively.  
 
7.1. RESULTS OF ESTIMATIONS  
 
7.1.1. Results with Model 1 
In this section we review the results of the regressions with the ordinary least square 
estimates of the first difference of logarithm of remittances for various periods.  
 
a. 1979-1993 period:  
Table 7.1 represents the ordinary least square estimates of logarithm of remittances for 1978-
1993 period, which is the only period that all variables are available. According to these 
results, a change in stock of workers abroad has no significant impact on remittances in 
1978-1993 period (see, Equations 1-2-3-4-6, Table 7.1). Changes in host country per capita 
income has a positive and significant impact on remittances. It also turned out that the 
significance of the impact of host country per capita income increase when we drop stock of 
workers variable from the equation. (see, Equations 7-8, Table 7.1). On the other hand, 
according to our results, first difference of home country per capita income has no significant 
impact on changes in remittances. (see, Equations 1-3-4-5-6-7, Table 7.1). Black market 
premium is the most significant variable in the model. Changes in black market premium 
have highly significant negative impact on remittances. (see, Equations 1-2-4-5-6-7, Table 
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7.1) But, we find that real overvaluation has no significant impact on remittances. (see, 
Equations 1-2-3-4-5, Table 7.1).Since real overvaluation and black market premium are 
highly correlated variables, we may argue that impact of black market premium dominates 
the impact of real overvaluation in the equations. The impact of depreciation adjusted interest 
differential is rather mixed. When worker stock is included in the equations changes in 
interest differential has no significant impact on remittances, but when we exclude worker 
stock interest differential significantly and positively affect remittances. (see, Equations 10-
12-13, Table 7.1). Domestic rate of inflation also has a negative and significant impact on 
remittances, reflecting that in periods of high inflation workers remit less, possibly due to 
increasing economic risk. (see, Equations 1-2-4-5-6-8, Table 7.1). When we drop inflation 
from the estimation explanatory power of regression significantly decrease and all the 
variables became insignificant, indicating that domestic rate of inflation is one of the most 
important factors in home country significantly affecting the inflow of remittances. (see, 
Equations 3, Table 7.1). On the other hand, domestic rate of growth has no significant impact 
on remittances. (see, Equations 1-2-3-5-6-7, Table 7.1). Since domestic rate of growth is 
highly significant with domestic per capita income we also carried out regressions that 
include these variables interchangeably. We observe that these variables remain insignificant. 
(see, Equations 2-4, Table 7.1). Extra government dummy, which represent periods of 
military administration, has a significant negative impact on remittances. This may be due to 
increasing economic and political risk in the country of origin. 
 
b. 1979-1999 period:  
Table 7.1, Equations 12 to 15, represents the ordinary least square estimates of the first 
difference of the logarithm of remittances for 1979-1999 period. Black market premium is 
not included in the equations in order to expand the data period, since 1994 and 1995 values 
of black market premium are not available. Period starts from 1979, since interest differential 
is available only after that year. According to our results, when we exclude black market 
premium from the estimations none of the variables significantly impact upon remittances. 
(see, Equations 12-13-14-15, Table 7.1). Explanatory powers of equations also decrease 
significantly when we exclude black market premium. So, we can argue that black market 
premium is an essential variable in our remittance model and equations that do not include 
black market premium cannot describe fluctuations in remittances.       
 
c. 1965-1993 period: 
Table 7.1, Equations 9 to 11, represent the ordinary least square estimates of the first 
difference of the logarithm of remittances for 1965-1993 period. In this case interest 
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differential is excluded and black market premium is included in the model. Different from 
the two cases, changes in stock of workers abroad have a significant positive impact on 
remittances. (see, Equations 9-11, Table 7.1) In addition, changes in domestic income have 
significant negative impact on remittances in this period. This may reflect consumption 
boosting considerations, arguing that workers remit more when domestic income level of 
family left in home country decrease. This consideration is especially valid at initial stages of 
migration when migrant workers family is left in the home country. So, our finding is 
consistent with the theory. When worker stock term is excluded from the equation, 
significance of domestic income increase and domestic rate of growth also become 
significant, positively affecting remittances. This positive correlation between growth and 
remittances may be due to the fact that periods of high growth reflect low economic risk and 
more opportunities for investment in the home country. So, the inflow of remittances in such 
periods is expected to increase. The explanatory power of estimation significantly decreases 
when we exclude worker stock. So, we can conclude that at initial periods of migration total 
worker stock abroad and economic situation in home country are dominant factors affecting 
remittances.   
 
7.1.2. Results with Model 2 
In this section we review the results of the regressions with the ordinary least square 
estimates of the first difference of the logarithm of per worker remittances for various 
periods. Table 7.2 represents the results. Stock of workers abroad is not included in the 
equations for this model, because we have already used this variable obtaining remittance per 
worker data.  
 
a. 1979-1993 period: 
A change in host country income per capita has significant positive impact on remittances in 
this period. (see, Equations 1-2-4-5-6, Table 7.2) On the other hand domestic income per 
capita, rate of real overvaluation and domestic growth have no significant impact on 
remittances in this period. (see, Equations 1-2-3-4-5-6, Table 7.2) Black market premium is 
again highly significant negatively affecting the changes in remittances. (see, Equations 1-2-
4-5-6, Table 7.2) Depreciation adjusted interest differential also has significant impact on per 
worker remittances. The direction of impact is positive, higher the differential between 
domestic and foreign rates of return higher will be per worker remittances. (see, Equations 1-
2-4-5-6, Table 7.2) Domestic rate of inflation is also highly significant negatively affecting 
per worker remittances. (see, Equations 1-2-4-5-6, Table 7.2) As in Model 1, also in this 
model dropping inflation from the estimation significantly decrease explanatory power of 
 40 
regression and all the variables become insignificant. (see, Equations 3, Table 7.2). Extra 
government dummy also has significant negative impact on per worker remittances. (see, 
Equations 1-2-4-5-6, Table 7.2)     
 
b. 1979-1999 period:  
Table 7.2, Equations 7 and 8, represents the ordinary least square estimates of the first 
difference of the logarithm of remittances per worker for 1979-1999 period. Black market 
premium is again not included in the equations in order to expand the data period. Again it 
turned out that, when we exclude black market premium from the estimations none of the 
variables significantly impact upon remittances per worker. (see, Equations 7-8, Table 7.2) 
Explanatory powers of equations also decrease significantly when we exclude black market 
premium.  
 
c. 1965-1993 period: 
Table 7.2, Equations 9 to 11, represent the ordinary least square estimates of the first 
difference of the logarithm of remittances per worker for 1965-1993 period. Again interest 
differential is excluded and black market premium is included in the model. According to our 
findings, changes in domestic income and domestic rate of growth have significant impact on 
remittances when both variables are included in the model. (see, Equation 9, Table 7.2) 
When we exclude growth from the equation, the impact of domestic income turns 
insignificant. (see, Equation 11, Table 7.2) Also, when we exclude domestic income from the 
equation, the impact of growth turns insignificant. (see, Equation 10, Table 7.2) Among other 
variables only the black market premium has a significant impact on per worker remittances. 
(see, Equations 10-11, Table 7.2) It is also insignificant when both domestic income and 
growth variables are included in the model. (see, Equation 9, Table 7.2)    
 
7.2. EVALUATION OF DIAGNOSTIC TESTS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In this section we evaluate the diagnostic tests and descriptive statistics of equations. The 
tests used in this study are Chow parameter constancy test,  “Chow” test; residual 
heteroscedasticity test, “hetero” test; residual normality test, “normality” test; residual serial 
correlation test, “AR(1-x)” test; and residual ARCH ( Autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity) test, “ARCH(1-x)” test, where x represent the maximum number of lags 
included in the test. Some tests were couldn’t carry out for all equations because of 
insufficient number of observations. Detailed information regarding the tests is given in  
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Chapter 5. The results of diagnostic tests are given in Table 7.3 for equations of Model 1 and 
Table 7.4 for equations of Model 2. 
  
a. MODEL 1: 
For Equations 8 and 11, the null of residual normality is rejected at 5 % significance level 
against residual non-normality and for Equation 9, the null of residual constant variance is 
rejected at 10 % significance level against residual serial correlation. Other than these 
equations, diagnostic tests do not indicate any sign of problems with our equations. When we 
look at the descriptive statistics, we observe that explanatory power of equations 
significantly decrease (i.e., R2 decrease and standard error increase) when we drop black 
market premium from the equations. Excluding domestic rate of inflation also decrease 
explanatory power of equations.  
 
b. MODEL 2: 
For Equations 6, 10 and 11, the null of residual normality is rejected at 5 % significance level 
against residual non-normality and for Equation 9, the null of residual homoscedasticity is 
rejected at 5 % level against residual heteroscedasticity. Diagnostic tests do not indicate any 
sign of problems with our equations other than these equations. Again explanatory power of 
regressions significantly decreases when we drop black market premium or interest 
differential terms from the equations. Dropping domestic inflation rate also decrease 
explanatory power of regressions.   
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CHAPTER 8:     CONCLUSION 
 
Turkish workers have been migrating abroad for employment for the past four decades. 
Exporting workers abroad started in the early 1960s with mainly to Western Europe and 
especially to the Federal Republic of Germany. Since the early 1960s over 2 million Turkish 
workers have migrated for employment to about 30 countries. Remittances from migrant 
workers have come to play a major role in the economies of the labor-sending countries. 
Turkey, like many other developing and labor exporting countries, has attempted to maximize 
the inflow of these remittances that come through official channels through special exchange 
rates for remittances, special interest rates for the foreign currency accounts maintained by 
the Turks abroad with the Turkish Central Bank, a program which permits Turks residing 
abroad to shorten their compulsory military service by paying a fee in foreign currency, 
special import privileges for consumer goods and machinery and the right to buy consumer 
durables with foreign exchange at special “duty free” shops during the first six months after 
return. These privileges are mainly built on the assumption that macroeconomic factors 
significantly impact on workers’ remittances. But, whether remittances of Turkish workers 
are affected from these factors is not well established.  
 
According to Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar (1986), macroeconomic factors other than level 
of economic activity in host country and total worker stock, have no significant effect on the 
inflow of remittances. On the other hand, Wahba (1991), Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) and El-
Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) argue that macroeconomic factors have an influential role on the 
inflow of remittances. But, they contrast on the direction of the impact of various variables. 
So, there is still ongoing debate on the impact of macroeconomic variables on remittances.   
 
This study mainly focuses on the question of whether macroeconomic variables are really 
significant in determining remittances for the Turkish case. We also analyze the direction of 
impact for various variables. We used two models, one using the level of remittances as the 
dependent variable and the other using remittances per worker as the dependent variable. The 
potential determinants of workers’ remittances in our models are: the level of economic 
activity in host countries and in the country of origin, total stock of Turkish workers abroad, 
black market premium, real overvaluation of TL, domestic rate of inflation and growth, 
depreciation adjusted interest differential between the country of origin and the host countries, 
and finally a dummy variable representing the periods of military administration in Turkey. 
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The general finding of the earlier studies that the level of economic activity in host counties 
has an impact on remittance flows is further supported in our study. In both the level and per 
worker remittances models host country income is found to have a significant positive impact 
on the remittances, in the 1979-1993 period. When we enlarge the data period by dropping 
black market premium or interest differential from the estimations, host country income loose 
its significance. But, as observed from the descriptive statistics of these equations (see, R2 and 
standard error values for the equations), it is hard to argue that these equations represent a 
good model of remittances. These equations are reported to demonstrate the significance of 
some variables in modeling remittances (such as, black market premium and interest 
differentials). Because, one can observe that dropping these equations from the estimations 
significantly decrease the explanatory power of the equations.    
 
According to our findings, changes in the stock of workers abroad have significant positive 
impact on remittance inflows in 1965-1993 period. But, the variable has no significant impact 
on the changes in remittance inflows in 1979-1993 and 1979-1999 periods. This result may be 
due to the fact that stock of Turkish workers abroad was on an increasing trend in the 1965-
1979 period, and in a sense stabilized after that period. So, a change in the stock of workers 
was one of the main determinants of remittances at the initial stages of migration, but it lost 
its significance in the following years.    
 
In the 1979-1993 period, the impact of depreciation adjusted interest differential is rather 
mixed. When worker stock is included in the equations, changes in the interest differential 
has no significant impact on remittances. But when we exclude the worker stock, the interest 
differential significantly and positively affects remittances. Depreciation adjusted interest 
differential also has significant impact on per worker remittances. The direction of impact is 
positive, higher the differential between domestic and foreign rates of return higher will be 
per worker remittances. When we drop black market premium from the estimations, as other 
variables, interest differential looses its significance. These findings support the findings of 
Elbadawi and Rocha (1992), and El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) in that the interest differential 
has a significant impact on remittance inflows. However, our findings contrast with the 
findings of Swamy (1981) and Straubhaar (1986) in that the interest differential has no 
significant impact.  
 
The results also reveal that remittance flows are highly responsive to the differential between 
the official and black market exchange rates. It turns out that, in both models the difference  
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between the black market and official rate of exchange has a significant negative impact on 
the inflow of remittances. As emphasized above, when we drop black market premium from 
the estimations, there is a significant decrease in explanatory power of equations. This 
supports the conclusions of Wahba (1991), Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) among others, and 
contrasts with the findings of Swamy (1982) and Straubhaar (1986). According to El-Sakka 
and Mcnabb (1999) migrants will prefer the black market when differentials between the 
black market rate and the official rate increase, because they will get extra return from the 
black market and a high black market premium is often associated with inconsistent 
macroeconomic policy. Real overvaluation of TL is positively correlated with the black 
market premium, but in all regressions it turned to be insignificant.  
 
Turning to the impact of the level of economic activity in the country of origin, the results 
suggest that the first difference of home country per capita income has no significant impact 
on changes in remittances in, 1979-1993 period. In 1965-1993 period, when interest rate 
differential is excluded from the estimations, according to level of remittances model, 
changes in domestic income have significant negative impact on remittances. This may reflect 
consumption smoothing considerations, arguing that workers remit more when domestic 
income level of family left in home country decrease. This consideration is especially valid at 
initial stages of migration when migrant workers family is left in the home country. When 
worker stock term is excluded from the equation, significance of domestic income increases. 
According to per worker remittances model, changes in domestic income have significant 
impact on remittances when domestic rate of growth is also included in the model. These 
results contrast with the findings of El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) in that domestic income has 
a positive impact.   
 
Domestic rate of inflation also has a negative and significant impact on remittances, in both 
models, for the 1979-1993 period; reflecting that in periods of high inflation workers remit 
less, possibly due to increasing economic risk. When we drop inflation from the estimation 
explanatory power of regression significantly decrease and all the variables became 
insignificant, indicating that domestic rate of inflation is one of the most important factors in 
home country significantly affecting the inflow of remittances. For the 1965-1993 and 1979-
1999 periods, when we drop black market premium or interest rate differential from 
estimations, domestic rate of inflation looses its significance. These results contrast with the 
findings of El-Sakka and Mcnabb (1999) in that inflation has a positive impact on  
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remittances; and support the findings of Elbadawi and Rocha (1992) and Katseli and Glytsos 
(1986) in that the direction of impact is negative. 
 
Domestic rate of growth has no significant impact on remittances in both models for 1979-
1993 period. Since domestic rate of growth is highly correlated with domestic per capita 
income we also carried out regressions that include these variables interchangeably. We 
observe that these variables remain insignificant. In the 1965-1993 period, when worker stock 
term is excluded from the equations, which take the level of remittances as the dependent 
variable, significance of domestic income increase and domestic rate of growth also become 
significant, positively affecting remittances. This positive correlation between growth and 
remittances may be due to the fact that periods of high growth reflect low economic risk and 
more opportunities for investment in the home country. So, the inflow of remittances in such 
periods is expected to increase. In per worker remittances model, changes in domestic income 
and domestic rate of growth have significant impact on remittances when both variables are 
included in the model.  
 
The extra government dummy, representing the periods with military administration, 
significantly affects the inflow of remittances in both models. The direction of the impact of 
extra government dummy was negative, meaning that periods with military administration 
negatively affect the changes in inflow of remittances and changes in remittances per worker. 
 
Based on the findings above, we conclude that macroeconomic variables significantly impact 
on workers’ remittances for the Turkish case. So, governments of labor exporting countries 
can influence the inflow of remittances via developing appropriate macroeconomic policies 
and forming special laws for the migrant workers. Our results also indicate that, preventing 
the flow of remittances to the unofficial market is also a main concern for increasing the 
inflow of remittances, which can be achieved by developing the required financial 
intermediation and preventing exchange rate misalignments.   
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GRAPH 2.1: Total Number of Recruited Turkish Workers
1961-2001 
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GRAPH 2.2: Number of Turkish Workers Sent to Germany
1961-2001
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GRAPH 2.3: Number of Turkish Workers Sent to Saudi Arabia
1961-2001 
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GRAPH 2.4: Number of Turkish Workers Sent to Libya
1961-2001
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GRAPH 2.5: Number of Turkish Workers Sent to Rep. Of Former USSR
1961-2001 
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GRAPH 2.6: Gross Domestic Product of Turkey 1964-2001
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GRAPH 2.7: Annual Inflation Rates, Turkey
 1965-2001
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GRAPH 2.8: Turkish Workers' Remittances 1964-2000
(in millions of US$)
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GRAPH 2.11: Workers' Remittances as Percentage of GDP
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GRAPH 2.9: Workers' Remittances as Percetage of Imports (1964-2000) 
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GRAPH 2.10: Workers' Remittances as Percentage of Exports (1964-2000) 
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Graph 6.1: Remittances per Worker (1964-2001)
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Total Stock of Turkish Workers Abroad (1964-2001)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
(t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s
 
Graph 6.3: Black Market Premium in Turkey (1964-1993)
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GRAPH 6.4: HOST COUNTRY INCOME PER CAPITA (1964-2001)
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GRAPH 6.5: TURKISH GDP per CAPITA in 1987 PRICES (1964-2001)
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
2000
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
(t
ho
us
an
d 
TL
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
GRAPH 6.6: DOMESTIC RATE OF GROWTH FOR TURKEY (1964-2001)
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GRAPH 6.7: REAL OVERVALUATION IN TURKEY (1964-1999)
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GRAPH 6.8: DEPRECIATION ADJUSTED INTEREST DIFFERENTIAL (1978-2001)
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Table 2.1: Turkey’s recruitment and social security agreements, 1961-2000.  
Country Name Recruitment Agreements Social Security Agreements 
England               --- 09 September 1961 
Federal Rep. of Germany 30 October 1961* 30 April 1964 
Austria 15 May 1964 1. 12 October 1966  
2. 28 October 1999 
Belgium 16 July 1964 4 July 1966 
Netherlands 19 August 1964  5 April 1966 
Switzerland                  --- 1 May 1969 
France 8 April 1965 20 January 1972 
Sweden 10 March 1967 2 September 1977 
Norway                  --- 20 July 1978 
Australia 5 October 1967              --- 
Macedonia                  --- 06 July 1998 
Turkish Rep. of 
Northern Cyprus  
                 --- 09 March 1987 
Denmark                  --- 1.13 November 1970 
2.22 October 1976 
Libya 5 January 1975 1. 20 March 1976 
2. 13 September 1984 
(*): Agreement was revised at 30 September 1964. 
Source: (Gökdere, 1978) and Ministry of Labor, Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 
 
 
TABLE 2.2: Workers sent abroad through the Turkish Employment Service, 1961-2000     
                  
Rep.of 
former   
Years Germany France Austria Netherlands Belgium Switzerland Australia Libyan A.J. Saudi Arabia Iraq  USSR Others Total 
1961 1476 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1476 
1962 11025 0 160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11185 
1963 23436 63 937 251 5605 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 30328 
1964 54902 25 1434 2958 6651 193 0 0 0 0 0 13 66176 
1965 45572 0 1973 2181 1661 122 0 0 0 0 0 11 51520 
1966 32580 0 469 1208 0 153 0 0 0 0 0 0 34410 
1967 7199 0 1043 48 0 215 0 215 0 0 0 135 8855 
1968 41409 0 673 875 0 97 107 0 0 0 0 43 43204 
1969 98142 191 973 3404 0 183 970 0 0 0 0 112 103975 
1970 96936 9036 10622 4843 431 1598 1186 0 0 0 0 4923 129575 
1971 65684 7897 4620 4853 583 1342 879 0 0 0 0 2584 88442 
1972 65875 10610 4472 744 113 1312 640 0 0 0 0 1463 85229 
1973 103793 17544 7083 1994 265 1109 886 0 0 0 0 3146 135820 
1974 1228 10577 2501 1503 555 770 1138 1015 0 0 0 924 20211 
1975 640 25 226 32 59 229 401 2121 251 0 0 435 4419 
1976 2101 6 672 98 72 281 339 4098 1832 0 0 1059 10558 
1977 2413 15 583 83 45 246 542 8582 4722 0 0 1853 19084 
1978 1333 13 54 48 41 326 549 7726 5769 0 0 2993 18852 
1979 933 11 23 40 27 406 407 9825 8522 0 0 3436 23630 
1980 764 21 944 32 35 549 409 15090 5643 0 0 5016 28503 
1981 274 6 184 31 13 379 321 30667 14379 10467 0 2032 58753 
1982 75 9 12 2 2 163 125 26686 12325 8906 0 1083 49388 
1983 43 4 7 4 2 209 181 23292 20238 7367 0 1123 52470 
1984 17 0 2 5 3 69 145 16410 25985 2430 0 749 45815 
1985 23 4 16 5 7 110 250 9680 35067 1612 0 579 47353 
1986 17 3 52 12 0 137 391 8381 23771 2160 0 684 35608 
1987 422 4 18 18 2 83 422 10986 27109 1725 0 18 40807 
1988 85 0 34 0 0 96 372 13194 34645 3717 0 878 53021 
1989 51 0 142 0 0 38 271 12608 32319 2549 932 1018 49928 
1990 62 0 423 0 0 64 255 8606 33077 1274 1243 2703 47707 
1991 49 0 315 0 0 66 308 4728 40782 6 4695 2071 53020 
1992 1685 0 239 0 0 52 208 2432 46467 0 6708 2209 60000 
1993 1999 0 82 0 0 32 166 2549 35826 0 21436 1154 63244 
1994 2032 0 10 0 0 13 139 1869 13050 0 41837 2195 61145 
1995 2246 0 16 0 0 18 248 1753 14529 0 35792 4881 59483 
1996 2443 0 5 0 0 31 97 2063 5635 0 20460 9963 40697 
1997 1800 0 0 0 0 0 21 1833 7657 0 13195 8815 33321 
1998 1734 0 1 0 0 10 4 1032 6821 0 7426 8879 25907 
1999 2350 25 1 2 1 5 11 698 5178 0 6786 2412 17475 
2000 2135 87 1 1 1 1 4 385 1862 0 6740 2428 13645 
2001 2437 202 5 2 1 1 5 238 4657 0 7600 5087 20235 
Total: 679420 56378 41027 25277 16175 10744 12397 228762 468118 42213 174850 89107 1844474 
              
1. This table presents data on Turkish workers sent abroad through the TES; such data may underestimate emigration by 20-40 percent. 
2. Data on Germany represent the Federal Republic till 1991 and Germany after then. 
3. Sources: Ministry of Labor, Turkey; State Statistics Institute, Turkey. 
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Table 2.3: Number of Recruited Turkish Workers by Host Country (1999-2001)  
COUNTRIES 1999 2000 2001 
USA 131 46 104 
Germany 2.350 2.135 2.437 
Portugal 0 2 0 
Australia 11 4 5 
Austria 1 1 5 
Belgium 1 1 1 
Denmark 14 3 5 
France 25 87 202 
Holland 2 1 2 
England 23 29 19 
Sweden 1 3 5 
Switzerland 5 1 1 
Italy 2 2 2 
Canada 2 1 7 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 254 159 22 
Libya 698 385 238 
S. Arabia 5.178 1.862 4.657 
Russian Federation 2.215 2.199 4.190 
Romania 196 0 13 
Japan 65 9 0 
Pakistan 91 63 11 
Azerbaijan 152 214 267 
Bulgaria 107 37 4 
Kyrgyzstan 88 177 34 
Turkmenistan 1.576 2.191 1.327 
Uzbekistan 872 176 455 
Kazakhstan 1.524 1.790 1.290 
Georgia 150 157 65 
Israel 1.485 1.322 3.917 
Bermuda 0 1 3 
Bahrain 0 73 0 
Jordan 20 166 203 
Malta 3 2 6 
United Arab Emirates 0 21 0 
Ukraine 93 222 90 
Greece 0 7 3 
Panama 0 1 0 
Luxembourg 0 2 37 
Moldavia 119 20 2 
Ethiopia 16 0 0 
Croatia 2 72 86 
Guernsey 2 0 0 
Barbuda 1 0 0 
Belarus 0 0 299 
Albania 0 0 201 
Kuwait 0 0 11 
Syria 0 0 9 
Total 17.475 13.645 20235 
Source: İşkur (Turkish Employment Service), 2001. 
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TABLE 2.4: Numbers of Turkish Nationals, Workers and Unemployed Persons by Country (October, 2001) 
  
 COUNTRY 
  
No. of 
Citizens 
  
No. of 
Workers 
  
No. of 
Unemployed 
Persons 
  
Unemployment Rate 
of Turkish Workers 
(%) 
 
General 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
A)WEST EUROPE           
Germany 2.053.600 727.780 147.922 20,08 9,00 
France 311.356 76.122 32.623 30,00 8,70 
Holland* 308.890 54.000 11.000 20,00 3,00 
Austria 134.229 57.098 4.836 9,76 5,05 
Belgium 69.183 25.021 9.083 34,26 8,33 
Sweden 35.844 5.800 1.700 22,50 4,30 
England 79.000 44.000 - 11,50 5,30 
Denmark 35.232 15.596 3.449 22,40 5,20 
Italy 10.000       10,50 
Finland 3.325       15,90 
Spain 1.000       23,30 
Luxemburg 210 60     2,30 
Switzerland 79.501 33.888 2.427 6.60 1,70 
Norway 10.000 6000     4,50 
Liechtenstein 809 339 49 7,80 4,00 
TOTAL 3.132.179 1.045.704 213.089     
TURKISH REPUBLICS           
Azerbaijan 5000 2000       
Turkmenistan 5.000 -       
Uzbekistan 3.700 1.881       
Kazakhstan 7.000         
Kyrgyzstan 2.050 1.500       
Tajikistan 300         
TOTAL 23.050 5.381       
MIDDLEAST & 
NORTH AFRICA 
          
S.Arabia 100.000 95.000       
Libya 2.400 1.934       
Kuwait 3.000 2.750       
Jordan 1.130 200       
Qatar 400 400       
TOTAL 106.930 100.284       
OTHER COUNTRIES           
Russian Federation 30.000 10.514       
Belarus 70 4       
Georgia 1.200 500       
Ukraine 800 350       
Moldova 200         
Israel 15.000         
Japan 1,729 1.729       
ABD 130.000       5,3 
Canada 35.000       6,7 
Australia 52.620 13.500 2.278 16.87 6,60 
South Africa 500 250       
TOTAL 267.119 26.847 2.278     
GENERAL TOTAL 3.487.112 1.174.781 219.527     
 
Note    : The number of unemployed persons is included in the number of workers. 
            : (*) Those holding the double nationality status are included in the number of citizens. 
Source: General Directorate of External Relations and Services for Workers Abroad, Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
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 TABLE 2.5: WR and selected indicators of Turkey, 1964-2000 
 (All in millions of US$) WR as WR as WR as 
Years WR* Imports Exports GDP %Imports %Exports %GDP 
1964 9 538 411 7841 1,7 2,2 0,11 
1965 70 572 463 8442 12,2 15,1 0,83 
1966 115 718 491 10058 16,0 23,4 1,14 
1967 93 685 522 11168 13,6 17,8 0,83 
1968 107 764 496 18168 14,0 21,6 0,59 
1969 141 801 537 20307 17,6 26,3 0,69 
1970 273 948 588 17875 28,8 46,4 1,53 
1971 471 1171 677 17099 40,2 69,6 2,75 
1972 740 1563 885 21545 47,3 83,6 3,43 
1973 1183 2086 1317 27100 56,7 89,8 4,37 
1974 1426 3778 1532 37338 37,7 93,1 3,82 
1975 1312 4739 1401 46678 27,7 93,6 2,81 
1976 982 5129 1960 53383 19,1 50,1 1,84 
1977 982 5796 1753 60909 16,9 56,0 1,61 
1978 983 4599 2288 67226 21,4 43,0 1,46 
1979 1694 5069 2261 91727 33,4 74,9 1,85 
1980 2071 7909 2910 68790 26,2 71,2 3,01 
1981 2490 8933 4703 71040 27,9 52,9 3,51 
1982 2140 8843 5746 64546 24,2 37,2 3,32 
1983 1513 9235 5728 61678 16,4 26,4 2,45 
1984 1807 10757 7134 59990 16,8 25,3 3,01 
1985 1714 11343 7958 67235 15,1 21,5 2,55 
1986 1634 11105 7457 75728 14,7 21,9 2,16 
1987 2021 14158 10190 87261 14,3 19,8 2,32 
1988 1776 14335 11662 90764 12,4 15,2 1,96 
1989 3040 15792 11625 107120 19,3 26,2 2,84 
1990 3246 22302 12959 150720 14,6 25,0 2,15 
1991 2819 21047 13593 150980 13,4 20,7 1,87 
1992 3008 22871 14715 160260 13,2 20,4 1,88 
1993 2919 29428 15345 180210 9,9 19,0 1,62 
1994 2627 23270 18106 129700 11,3 14,5 2,03 
1995 3327 35709 21637 170050 9,3 15,4 1,96 
1996 3542 43627 23224 181680 8,1 15,3 1,95 
1997 4197 48559 26261 190660 8,6 16,0 2,20 
1998 5356 45921 26974 198840 11,7 19,9 2,69 
1999 4529 40671 26587 188370 11,1 17,0 2,40 
2000 4560 54503 27775 199300 8,4 16,4 2,29 
*: WR represent workers’ remittances. 
Source: State Statistics Institute, (DİE), Turkey. 
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 TABLE 4.1: DATA USED IN THE MODELS 
             EXGOV 
 REM REMPW WORKER BMP INFLATION GROWTH ROV YDOM YHOST INTDIF DUM 
1964 9 106 85 38,89 1,69 4,08 119,28 811 1762 N.A. 0 
1965 70 471 148 36,11 5,92 3,14 124,28 810 1901 N.A. 0 
1966 115 614 187 36,67 4,36 11,99 125,93 889 2012 N.A. 0 
1967 93 559 166 41,67 6,75 4,21 130,8 908 2039 N.A. 0 
1968 107 606 177 52,78 0,4 6,67 126,01 942 2189 N.A. 0 
1969 141 523 270 53,33 7,87 4,32 128,95 958 2479 N.A. 0 
1970 273 676 404 6 6,93 4,44 101,9 976 2450 N.A. 0 
1971 471 900 523 9,64 15,74 7,05 86,96 1019 2789 N.A. 1 
1972 740 1211 611 4,29 11,67 9,17 99,38 1085 3354 N.A. 1 
1973 1183 1670 708 5 15,44 4,91 108,01 1110 4482 N.A. 1 
1974 1426 1928 740 6,15 15,82 3,26 114,46 1118 4945 N.A. 0 
1975 1312 1934 678 11,22 19,2 6,06 120,56 1155 5536 N.A. 0 
1976 982 1508 651 8,58 17,36 9,00 120,39 1233 5917 N.A. 0 
1977 982 1465 670 35,03 27,08 2,99 128,12 1244 6848 N.A. 0 
1978 983 1426 689 50,1 45,29 1,23 128,19 1233 8427 -0,97 0 
1979 1694 2377 713 52,76 58,69 -0,49 142,85 1202 9986 -0,97 0 
1980 2071 2794 741 15,97 110,17 -2,78 108,11 1145 10960 -0,99 1 
1981 2490 2803 888 19,89 36,58 4,81 91,5 1171 9458 -0,9 1 
1982 2140 1973 1084 15,13 30,84 3,09 77,16 1177 9232 -0,82 1 
1983 1513 1490 1016 11,39 31,4 4,21 70,83 1197 8925 -0,76 1 
1984 1807 1668 1083 1,18 48,38 7,11 61,94 1250 8204 -0,77 0 
1985 1714 1600 1071 -10,15 44,96 4,30 60,91 1272 8131 -0,84 0 
1986 1634 1501 1089 7,15 34,62 6,76 62,29 1328 10826 -0,87 0 
1987 2021 1910 1058 7,75 38,85 9,81 65,6 1427 13599 -0,88 0 
1988 1776 1675 1060 9,1 73,67 1,45 66,02 1417 14712 -0,82 0 
1989 3040 2739 1110 1,57 63,27 1,63 68,93 1409 14628 -0,74 0 
1990 3246 2824 1149 1,22 60,31 9,37 85,28 1505 17981 -0,84 0 
1991 2819 2253 1251 5,8 65,97 0,35 84,91 1483 19998 -0,88 0 
1992 3008 2258 1332 6,3 70,07 6,40 85,08 1549 21625 -0,83 0 
1993 2919 2228 1310 4,43 66,1 8,14 85,88 1645 21084 -0,82 0 
1994 2627 1974 1331 NA 106,26 -6,08 64,05 1517 22606 -0,92 0 
1995 3327 2514 1323 NA 88,11 7,95 75,68 1609 26093 -0,77 0 
1996 3542 2803 1264 NA 80,35 7,12 74,68 1693 25338 -0,71 0 
1997 4197 3339 1257 NA 85,73 8,29 72,65 1800 23113 -0,7 0 
1998 5356 4402 1217 NA 84,64 3,86 76,95 1837 23557 -0,69 0 
1999 4529 3837 1180 NA 64,87 -6,08 77,3 1695 23426 -0,61 0 
2000 4560 3863 1180 NA 54,92 6,34 NA 1766 21167 0,19 0 
2001 2837 2415 1175 NA 54,4 -9,43 NA 1573 21305 -0,85 0 
SYMBOL DESCRIPTION   
REM:   Total cash remittances of Turkish workers (in millions of US$s)   
REMPW: Cash remittances of Turkish workers per worker (in US$s)    
WORKER: Stock of Turkish workers abroad (in thousands)   
BMP:   Black market premium (%)   
INFLATION: Domestic CPI inflation rate (%)   
GROWTH: Domestic growth rate of GDP at 1987 prices (%)   
ROV:   Real overvaluation (index number)   
YDOM: Domestic GDP per capita at 1987 prices (in thousands of TL)   
YHOST: Host country GDP per capita (in US$s)   
INTDIF: Exchange rate depreciation adjusted interest differential     
EXGOVDUM: Extra government dummy   
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Table 6.1: Stock of workers in host countries    Former   Real 
Years Germany France Austria Netherlands Belgium Switzerland Australia England Libya S. Arabia  USSR Others Total Stock Stock 
1964 90839 88 2531 3209 12256 229 0 0 0 0 0 13 109165 84785 
1965 136411 88 4504 5390 13917 351 0 0 0 0 0 24 160685 148485 
1966 168991 88 4973 6598 13917 504 0 0 0 0 0 24 195095 187385 
1967 176190 88 6016 6646 13917 719 0 0 215 0 0 159 203950 166413 
1968 217599 88 6689 7521 13917 816 107 0 215 0 0 202 247154 176540 
1969 315741 279 7662 10925 13917 999 1077 0 215 0 0 314 351129 269710 
1970 412677 9315 18284 15768 14348 2597 2263 575 215 0 0 4662 480704 403850 
1971 478361 17212 22904 20621 14931 3939 3142 1864 215 0 0 4286 569146 523161 
1972 544236 27822 27376 21365 15044 5251 3782 1946 215 0 0 4551 654375 610847 
1973 648029 45366 34459 23359 15309 6360 4668 2062 215 0 0 5307 790195 708384 
1974 649257 55943 36960 24862 15864 7130 5806 2175 1230 0 0 6118 810406 739500 
1975 649897 55968 37186 24894 15923 7359 6207 2273 3351 251 0 6455 814825 678424 
1976 651998 55974 37858 24992 15995 7640 6546 2300 7449 2083 0 7487 825383 651236 
1977 654411 55989 38441 25075 16040 7886 7088 2330 16031 6805 0 9310 844467 670320 
1978 655744 56002 38495 25123 16081 8212 7637 2402 23757 12574 0 12231 863319 689172 
1979 656677 56013 38518 25163 16108 8618 8044 2467 33582 21096 0 15602 886949 712802 
1980 657441 56034 39462 25195 16143 9167 8453 2518 48672 26739 0 20567 915452 741305 
1981 590623 38000 30130 47326 23000 20119 16000 3000 38000 45000 0 37092 888290 888290 
1982 652751 63839 30219 68743 25000 24001 12277 3000 80000 80000 0 44595 1084425 1084425 
1983 542512 64070 27733 55000 25000 24751 20000 11648 75500 120000 0 49330 1015544 1015544 
1984 595568 65832 29166 77675 31100 25254 29000 11648 38000 140000 0 39980 1083223 1083223 
1985 585596 65832 29165 77675 31100 25254 29000 11648 27000 150000 0 39043 1071313 1071313 
1986 597092 76580 33437 77700 32500 25254 29000 5000 23000 150000 0 39090 1088653 1088653 
1987 609515 78000 33438 78000 32500 27074 29000 5000 22000 105000 0 38487 1058014 1058014 
1988 626019 82000 35043 80000 35100 28134 29000 5000 27000 75000 0 38154 1060450 1060450 
1989 654219 91520 42423 82000 35100 30698 29000 5000 25000 75000 0 40005 1109965 1109965 
1990 661385 98000 59128 89000 23488 33394 29000 5000 18205 95000 0 37866 1149466 1149466 
1991 694502 111890 58055 89000 23715 36027 29000 30000 10221 130000 0 38554 1250964 1250964 
1992 762775 99000 55749 83400 24000 36815 29000 30000 9000 150000 20000 32278 1332017 1332017 
1993 766648 104432 56279 85498 23488 37371 29000 14274 7742 130000 22000 33361 1310093 1310093 
1994 763697 102900 54058 84500 23488 37640 31000 15746 5802 120000 40000 52188 1331019 1331019 
1995 742566 102900 51297 84500 26764 35828 31000 15746 5802 120000 40000 67083 1323486 1323486 
1996 740277 72544 51327 65000 37500 34825 21085 33000 5810 120000 40000 42134 1263502 1263502 
1997 748814 94224 53715 57000 27118 40883 21609 36280 5570 115000 24731 31969 1256913 1256913 
1998 739446 78965 61096 48000 26855 32944 16484 37880 2600 115000 24731 32786 1216787 1216787 
1999 743148 76122 55555 51000 15938 33262 9130 40450 2400 110000 24731 18684 1180420 1180420 
2000 743148 76122 55555 51000 15938 33262 9130 40450 2400 110000 24731 18684 1180420 1180420 
2001 727780 76122 57098 54000 25021 33888 13500 44000 1934 95000 16749 29689 1174781 1174781 
1. 1964-1980 cumulative number of workers sent abroad up to that year; Source: TES      
2. 1981-2001 stock of workers in each country; Source: Ministry of Labor, Turkey.       
3. For 1981-2001 data, unemployed citizens are also included.       
4. For the real stock column, 1964-1976 from Gokdere 1978 p.43, 1977-1980 recruited workers are added to previous stock.      
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TABLE 6.2: WEIGHTS FOR HOST COUNTRIES, 1964-2001           
Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 
Austria 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,03 
Belgium 0,11 0,09 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,04 0,06 
Germany 0,84 0,85 0,87 0,87 0,88 0,91 0,87 0,84 0,85 0,83 0,81 0,81 0,8 0,78 0,77 0,77 0,75 0,7 0,63 
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,08 
Netherlands 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,06 0,07 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,08 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 
Former USSR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
England 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
                    
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Austria 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 
Belgium 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 
France 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,06 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 
Germany 0,55 0,58 0,56 0,59 0,6 0,62 0,61 0,59 0,58 0,58 0,6 0,61 0,6 0,61 0,62 0,63 0,65 0,65 0,64 
Libya 0,08 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0,06 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05 
Saudi Arabia 0,12 0,13 0,15 0,14 0,1 0,07 0,07 0,09 0,11 0,12 0,1 0,09 0,1 0,1 0,09 0,1 0,09 0,09 0,08 
Switzerland 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 
Former USSR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 
England 0,01 0,01 0,01 0 0 0 0 0 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 
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TABLE 6.3: HOST COUNTRY GDP PER CAPITA (in US$s), 1964-2001            
                    
Country 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3098 3397 3907 5459 6417 6885 7507 7447 8388 9340 10629 12022 11697 
Austria 1237 1339 1451 1536 1642 1785 2014 2354 2894 3877 4597 5203 5581 6699 8061 9572 10625 9188 9176 
Belgium 1628 1760 1876 2000 2129 2355 2649 2958 3672 4714 5505 6448 6953 8089 9887 11381 12297 10201 8976 
France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2899 3207 3900 5028 5312 6681 6887 7561 9323 11185 12701 11082 10426 
Germany 1802 1945 2051 2064 2215 2504 2437 2797 3353 4475 4915 5419 5798 6722 8363 9897 10553 8853 8514 
Libya n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3318 2919 3313 3839 4910 5347 6564 7283 6886 9107 12091 9985 9507 
Netherlands 1490 1641 1764 1912 2100 2351 2585 2971 3651 5027 5871 6762 7341 8585 10427 11867 12675 10539 10172 
Saudi Arabia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1071 1248 1578 2393 3386 4434 6365 7727 7727 10468 15319 16117 12561 
Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3448 4117 4923 6580 7571 8721 9208 9866 13775 15436 16819 15319 15501 
Former USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
England n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2215 2493 2860 3212 3459 4149 3994 4499 5709 7416 9481 9077 8576 
HOST GDP 1762 1901 2012 2039 2189 2479 2450 2789 3354 4482 4945 5536 5917 6848 8427 9986 10960 9458 9232 
                    
Country 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia 11084 12115 10569 10815 12579 15701 17445 17963 18027 17432 16770 18882 19956 22153 21929 19390 20567 19869 18424 
Austria 9324 8794 9000 12758 15933 16922 16864 21001 21648 24166 23254 24876 29251 28723 25520 26171 25924 23333 23212 
Belgium 8485 8106 8428 11681 14536 15817 16075 20122 20610 23013 21840 23565 27826 27058 24556 25067 25009 22789 22554 
France 9881 9330 9714 13407 16197 17515 17496 21560 21548 23555 22198 23397 26810 26694 24062 24754 24414 21977 21988 
Germany 8541 8082 8194 11679 14546 15588 15289 19062 22213 25123 24120 25746 30130 29112 25759 26179 25656 22773 22427 
Libya 8694 7804 7719 6053 5395 5377 5457 6549 7059 6882 6440 6410 6211 6635 7148 5911 5618 6289 5029 
Netherlands 9860 9157 9281 12821 15475 16369 16052 19802 20122 22122 21331 22896 26857 26532 24174 25084 25210 23266 23703 
Saudi Arabia 9713 8647 7222 5856 5253 5076 5389 6864 7515 7616 7113 7002 7230 7762 7809 6652 7180 8415 7821 
Switzerland 15590 14807 14920 21251 26330 27938 26669 33610 33854 35066 33872 37141 43411 41657 35974 36749 36105 33228 34112 
Former USSR n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 404 912 1251 1495 1913 1988 1447 1087 1362 1608 
England 8117 7647 8098 9812 12025 14528 14622 17277 17938 18590 16577 17868 19368 20242 22507 24042 24511 23988 23765 
HOST GDP 8925 8204 8131 10826 13599 14712 14628 17981 19998 21625 21084 22606 26093 25338 23113 23557 23426 21167 21305 
                    
TABLE 6.2.1: GDP PER CAPITA FOR REPUBLICS OF FORMER USSR (in US$s)    
TABLE 6.2.2: Weights for Form Republics of USSR 
according to number of Turkish citizens in 2001 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  
Russian Fed. 6685.4 5412.4 575 1236 1817 2273 2825 2902 1920 1322 1777 2134  Russian Fed. 0,56 
Azerbaijan 3459.5 2097.2 163 179 160 322 419 517 575 588 670 719  Azerbaijan 0,1 
Kazakhstan 1767.6 1083.6 168 304 735 1063 1341 1457 1475 1138 1236 1501  Kazakhstan 0,13 
Kyrgyz Rep. 3280.7 2364.6 203 147 244 325 389 374 342 258 264 283  Kyrgyz Rep. 0,04 
Uzbekistan 2726.7 1725.5 166 255 296 454 609 629 624 700 557 461  Uzbekistan 0,07 
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. 246 1383 912 65 566 623 649 n.a. n.a. n.a.  Turkmenistan 0,1 
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TABLE 6.4: DEPOSIT RATES FOR TURKEY AND HOST COUNTRIES, 1964-2001 
                          
COUNTRY NAME DESCRIPTOR 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
AUSTRALIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 5,00 5,25 5,00 5,50 8,00 9,00 8,63 9,00 8,52 8,25 8,58 10,38 12,33 
AUSTRIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 
BELGIUM DEPOSIT RATE 3,35 3,50 3,65 3,67 3,10 4,56 5,92 4,65 2,90 4,27 6,75 5,41 5,62 5,46 4,50 5,50 7,69 7,50 7,46 
FRANCE DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 3,00 3,00 3,00 3,79 4,13 4,25 4,25 4,25 6,25 7,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 7,25 7,75 8,50 
GERMANY 3 MONTH DEPOSITS  
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 3,06 5,14 7,95 9,74 7,54 
LIBYA TIME DEPOSIT  
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 3,50 3,50 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 5,13 5,50 5,50 
NETHERLANDS DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 5,04 5,54 5,96 6,06 5,88 
RUSSIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
SAUDI ARABIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
SWITZERLAND DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 8,75 4,40 
ENGLAND DEPOSIT RATE 3,25 4,42 4,50 4,21 5,42 5,92 5,21 3,83 4,15 8,02 9,50 7,08 7,54 4,90 6,08 11,71 14,13 10,67 12,42 
TURKEY 3 MONTHS' TIME DEPOSITS 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 4,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 6,00 7,33 8,00 26,50 45,00 
                                          
COUNTRY NAME DESCRIPTOR 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AUSTRALIA DEPOSIT RATE 10,81 9,75 10,46 13,96 13,77 11,92 15,29 13,70 10,44 6,32 4,76 5,05 7,33 6,86 5,12 4,67 3,53 4,12 3,25 
AUSTRIA DEPOSIT RATE 4,21 4,00 3,94 3,63 3,03 2,73 2,98 3,41 3,75 3,69 2,98 2,31 2,19 1,71 1,50 2,65 2,21 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
BELGIUM DEPOSIT RATE 6,67 7,44 6,69 5,33 5,00 4,54 5,13 6,13 6,25 6,25 7,11 4,86 4,04 2,66 2,88 3,01 2,42 3,58 3,40 
FRANCE DEPOSIT RATE 8,08 7,08 6,25 5,00 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 3,67 3,50 3,21 2,69 2,63 3,00 
GERMANY 3 MONTH DEPOSITS  4,56 4,86 4,44 3,71 3,20 3,29 5,50 7,07 7,62 8,01 6,27 4,47 3,85 2,83 2,69 2,88 2,43 3,40 3,56 
LIBYA TIME DEPOSIT  5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 
     
n.a.      n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 3,21 3,00 3,00 
NETHERLANDS DEPOSIT RATE 4,03 4,10 4,10 3,93 3,55 3,48 3,49 3,31 3,18 3,20 3,11 4,70 4,40 3,54 3,18 3,10 2,74 2,89 3,08 
RUSSIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 101,96 55,05 16,77 17,05 13,68 6,51 4,85 
SAUDI ARABIA DEPOSIT RATE 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 6,68 8,03 9,04 8,01 5,83 3,65 3,52 5,10 6,18 5,47 5,79 6,21 6,14 6,67 3,92 
SWITZERLAND DEPOSIT RATE 3,31 3,77 4,36 3,51 3,08 4,50 8,08 8,28 7,63 5,50 3,50 3,63 1,28 1,34 1,00 0,69 1,24 3,00 1,68 
ENGLAND DEPOSIT RATE 11,19 7,27 11,79 9,85 8,57 8,55 11,51 12,54 10,28 7,46 3,97 3,66 4,11 3,05 3,63 4,48 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
     
n.a. 
TURKEY 3 MONTHS' TIME DEPOSITS 45,33 51,42 49,25 40,58 35,00 49,08 53,45 47,50 62,67 68,74 64,58 87,79 76,02 80,74 79,49 80,11 78,43 47,16 74,70 
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TABLE 6.5 (1): EXCHANGE RATES (NATIONAL CURRENCY PER TURKISH LIRA)             
COUNTRY NAME 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
AUSTRALIA 10,07 10,11 10,07 10,13 10,03 10,11 16,64 16,85 18,04 21,06 18,56 19,05 18,10 22,19 29,05 39,08 106,43 150,71 183,13 
AUSTRIA 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,35 0,58 0,60 0,61 0,71 0,82 0,82 0,99 1,28 1,89 2,84 6,53 8,41 11,19 
BELGIUM 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,30 0,32 0,32 0,34 0,39 0,38 0,46 0,59 0,88 1,26 2,86 3,47 3,98 
FRANCE 1,83 1,83 1,83 1,83 1,83 1,63 2,69 2,77 2,77 3,01 3,15 3,38 3,35 4,13 6,04 8,79 19,96 23,25 27,77 
GERMANY 2,27 2,26 2,27 2,26 2,26 2,45 4,09 4,33 4,42 5,23 5,81 5,78 7,05 9,24 13,81 20,42 46,02 59,26 78,58 
LIBYA 25,31 25,31 25,31 25,31 25,31 25,31 41,79 43,02 43,02 47,80 47,26 51,17 56,29 65,67 85,29 119,41 304,49 451,35 630,80 
NETHERLANDS 2,52 2,50 2,50 2,51 2,51 2,49 4,15 4,34 4,39 5,01 5,58 5,64 6,78 8,53 12,82 18,55 42,33 54,13 71,16 
SAUDI ARABIA 2,01 2,01 2,01 2,01 2,01 2,01 3,32 3,41 3,41 3,99 3,94 4,29 4,72 5,55 7,62 10,51 27,11 39,13 54,37 
SWITZERLAND 2,10 2,09 2,09 2,09 2,10 2,09 3,46 3,61 3,75 4,36 5,51 5,78 6,80 9,72 15,59 22,37 51,12 74,30 93,63 
UNITED KINGDOM 25,22 25,34 25,22 21,75 21,55 21,70 35,73 36,12 33,23 32,87 32,86 30,66 28,37 37,06 51,37 78,62 215,00 254,95 301,51 
RUSSIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
                    
COUNTRY NAME 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AUSTRALIA 255,09 368,15 392,78 503,78 737,60 1552,59 1834,06 2265,82 3860 5897 9799 30082 44439 85843 134198 193049 353967 373056 740436 
AUSTRIA 14,62 20,17 33,38 55,27 90,75 144,44 195,83 274,43 475 754 1192 3530 5913 9839 16275 26770 575957 617784 1294759 
BELGIUM 5,08 7,05 11,45 18,75 30,79 48,60 64,70 94,57 162 258 401 1216 2028 3367 5569 9095 575957 617784 1294759 
FRANCE 33,88 46,37 76,29 117,40 191,18 299,53 399,74 571,28 981 1555 2455 7244 12173 20580 34336 55934 575957 617784 1294759 
GERMANY 103,83 141,28 234,37 390,45 645,53 1019,40 1362,76 1961,22 3351 5306 8384 25004 41611 69318 114729 187964 575957 617784 1294759 
LIBYA 955,24 1502,22 1948,50 2414,32 3772,32 6361,19 7919,53 10857,38 18927 28425 44529 107684 168894 295192 528405 830845 1001969 1246234 2223048 
NETHERLANDS 92,28 125,30 208,10 345,71 574,35 907,65 1207,88 1733,77 2970 4721 7457 22319 37179 61812 101926 166489 575957 617784 1294759 
SAUDI ARABIA 80,92 124,40 158,26 202,35 272,60 484,60 617,81 782,40 1356 2287 3864 10341 15928 28778 54901 83969 144566 179809 387218 
SWITZERLAND 129,75 172,04 277,80 466,76 798,83 1206,68 1496,08 2261,73 3748 5882 9782 29528 51847 80047 141280 228452 338460 411479 864562 
UNITED KINGDOM 410,23 514,34 833,27 1117,36 1910,61 3283,95 3714,63 5649,18 9503 12949 21437 60509 92458 183002 340030 523111 875119 1004826 2103268 
RUSSIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 20637 11606 10909 12856 19384 34497 15228 20052 23913 48113 
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1. For the countries of Euro Area the depreciation is calculated using Euro rates for 1999-2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.5 (2): DEPRECIATION RATES FOR TURKISH LIRA               
COUNTRY NAME 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
AUSTRALIA n.a. 0,40 -0,40 0,63 -0,98 0,72 64,66 1,27 7,05 16,71 -11,83 2,59 -4,94 22,58 30,90 34,52 172,35 41,60 21,51 
AUSTRIA 0,00 -0,08 -0,08 0,12 0,00 0,00 65,10 3,48 2,46 16,57 14,57 0,22 21,43 29,25 47,04 50,55 129,56 28,86 33,04 
BELGIUM 0,00 -0,02 -0,82 0,86 -1,02 0,95 65,07 5,23 1,57 6,64 13,10 -1,04 20,84 27,45 48,54 43,75 126,90 21,49 14,56 
FRANCE n.a. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -11,11 65,10 2,93 0,00 8,65 4,74 7,30 -0,72 23,23 46,18 45,57 127,00 16,46 19,45 
GERMANY 0,00 -0,71 0,71 -0,54 -0,01 8,39 67,00 5,82 2,09 18,44 10,91 -0,50 22,10 30,94 49,55 47,80 125,39 28,79 32,60 
LIBYA n.a. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 65,10 2,93 0,00 11,11 -1,13 8,29 10,00 16,67 29,87 40,00 155,01 48,23 39,76 
NETHERLANDS 0,00 -0,53 -0,08 0,50 -0,28 -0,50 66,34 4,67 0,98 14,23 11,41 0,96 20,36 25,73 50,38 44,67 128,18 27,87 31,45 
SAUDI ARABIA n.a. 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 65,10 2,80 0,00 16,90 -1,13 8,91 10,00 17,50 37,31 37,92 158,07 44,32 38,95 
SWITZERLAND n.a. -0,07 -0,21 0,05 0,53 -0,37 65,18 4,52 3,74 16,34 26,27 4,99 17,66 42,89 60,33 43,54 128,47 45,35 26,02 
UNITED KINGDOM n.a. 0,46 -0,45 -13,76 -0,91 0,68 64,62 1,10 -8,01 -1,06 -0,05 -6,69 -7,46 30,62 38,62 53,04 173,47 18,58 18,26 
RUSSIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
                    
COUNTRY NAME 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
AUSTRALIA 39,29 44,33 6,69 28,26 46,41 110,49 18,13 23,54 70,34 52,80 66,16 206,99 47,73 93,17 56,33 43,85 83,36 5,39 98,48 
AUSTRIA 30,65 37,94 65,51 65,57 64,18 59,16 35,58 40,14 73,18 58,72 58,00 196,22 67,48 66,39 65,42 64,48 54,43 7,26 109,58 
BELGIUM 27,70 38,71 62,47 63,71 64,21 57,81 33,14 46,17 71,78 58,89 55,27 203,49 66,72 66,06 65,38 63,32 54,43 7,26 109,58 
FRANCE 22,00 36,86 64,55 53,87 62,85 56,67 33,46 42,91 71,67 58,60 57,83 195,09 68,05 69,05 66,84 62,90 54,43 7,26 109,58 
GERMANY 32,12 36,07 65,90 66,60 65,33 57,92 33,68 43,92 70,86 58,36 57,99 198,25 66,42 66,58 65,51 63,83 54,43 7,26 109,58 
LIBYA 51,43 57,26 29,71 23,91 56,25 68,63 24,50 37,10 74,32 50,19 56,65 141,83 56,84 74,78 79,00 57,24 20,60 24,38 78,38 
NETHERLANDS 29,69 35,77 66,09 66,12 66,14 58,03 33,08 43,54 71,30 58,96 57,94 199,32 66,58 66,25 64,90 63,34 54,43 7,26 109,58 
SAUDI ARABIA 48,83 53,74 27,22 27,86 34,72 77,77 27,49 26,64 73,37 68,59 68,98 167,58 54,03 80,68 90,77 52,95 72,17 24,38 115,35 
SWITZERLAND 38,58 32,59 61,47 68,02 71,14 51,06 23,98 51,18 65,70 56,96 66,30 201,86 75,59 54,39 76,50 61,70 48,15 21,57 110,11 
UNITED KINGDOM 36,06 25,38 62,01 34,09 70,99 71,88 13,11 52,08 68,22 36,27 65,54 182,27 52,80 97,93 85,81 53,84 67,29 14,82 109,32 
RUSSIA n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -43,76 -6,01 17,85 50,78 77,97 -55,86 31,68 19,25 101,20 
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TABLE 6.6: CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES USED IN MODELS 
          
  DLOGWORKER DLOGYHOST DLOGYDOM DBMP DROV DINTDIF DINFLATION GROWTH EXGOVDUM 
DLOGWORKER 1 -0,035 0,106 -0,107 -0,414 0,402 -0,343 0,296 0,561 
DLOGYHOST -0,035 1 0,321 0,145 0,301 -0,396 0,343 0,413 -0,108 
DLOGYDOM 0,106 0,321 1 0,251 0,242 -0,086 -0,295 0,934 -0,015 
DBMP -0,107 0,145 0,251 1 0,666 0,024 -0,502 0,069 -0,459 
DROV -0,414 0,301 0,242 0,666 1 -0,344 -0,105 0,076 -0,749 
DINTDIF 0,402 -0,396 -0,086 0,024 -0,344 1 -0,297 0,007 0,488 
DINFLATION -0,343 0,343 -0,295 -0,502 -0,105 -0,297 1 -0,202 -0,136 
GROWTH 0,296 0,413 0,934 0,069 0,076 0,007 -0,202 1 0,215 
EXGOVDUM 0,561 -0,108 -0,015 -0,459 -0,749 0,488 -0,136 0,215 1 
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 TABLE 6.7: AUGMENTED DICKEY-FULLER TEST RESULTS FOR VARIABLES 
      
  ADF CRITICAL VALUES 
  VARIABLE  TEST STATISTICS 1% 5% 10% 
1 BMP -2,1722 -3,6661 -2,9627 -2,6200 
2 DBMP -4,0160 -3,6852 -2,9705 -2,6242 
3 LOGYHOST -1,6111 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
4 DLOGYHOST -3,6530 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
5 LOGYDOM -2,2027 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
6 DLOGYDOM -3,4574 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
7 LOGWORKER -2,2503 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
8 DLOGWORKER -4,2067 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
9 LOGREM -2,2510 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
10 DLOGREM -4,1731 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
11 LOGREMPW -1,9645 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
12 DLOGREMPW -4,3490 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
13 INTDIF 0,0146 -3,7667 -3,0038 -2,6417 
14 DINTDIF -3,4238 -3,7856 -3,0114 -2,6457 
15 GROWTH -3,3915 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
16 INFLATION -1,8100 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
17 DINFLATION -5,3237 -3,6289 -2,9472 -2,6118 
18 ROV -1,6740 -3,6353 -2,9499 -2,6133 
19 DROV -3,4000 -3,6422 -2,9527 -2,6148 
20 EXGOVDUM -3,0114 -3,6228 -2,9446 -2,6105 
 74 
 TABLE 7.1. Modelling DLOGREM by OLS       
             
 1) Modelling DLOGREM by OLS, 1979-1993 period        
             
  CONSTANT DLOGWORKER DLOGYHOST DLOGYDOM DBMP DROV DINTDIF DINFLATION GROWTH EXGOVDUM R^2 S.E. 
EQ(1) -0,153 0,667 *1,597 -8,822 **-0,012 0,002 1,282 *-0,004 0,075 -0,226 0,706 0,097 
EQ(2) 0,026 0,727 *1,515 n.i. **-0,013 0,003 1,151 *-0,004 -0,008 *-0,189 0,685 0,092 
EQ(3) -0,163 1,510 0,730 -7,893 -0,007 0,004 0,990 n.i. 0,073 -0,135 0,457 0,121 
EQ(4) 0,011 0,709 *1,522 -0,860 **-0,012 0,003 1,159 *-0,004 n.i. *-0,193 0,689 0,091 
EQ(5) -0,149 n.i. *1,602 -9,609 **-0,012 0,002 *1,308 **-0,004 0,081 *-0,234 0,685 0,092 
EQ(6) -0,188 0,485 *1,665 -10,961 **-0,011 n.i. *1,299 **-0,004 0,095 **-0,267 0,689 0,091 
EQ(7) -0,176 n.i. **1,652 -11,022 **-0,011 n.i. *1,316 -0,004 0,094 -0,262 0,676 0,086 
EQ(8) 0,002 n.i. **1,592 n.i. **-0,012 n.i. **1,299 **-0,004 n.i. **-0,210 0,569 0,088 
             
 2) Modelling DLOGREM by OLS, 1965-1993 period        
EQ(9) -0,339 **1,871 0,244 *-17,069 -0,003 0,005 n.i. 0,000 0,156 -0,036 0,713 0,124 
EQ(10) **-0,763 n.i. 0,820 **-39,268 -0,005 0,003 n.i. -0,001 **0,365 -0,076 0,443 0,168 
EQ(11) 0,020 **2,249 0,180 n.i. -0,003 *0,006 n.i. 0,000 -0,006 -0,008 0,671 0,129 
             
 3) Modelling DLOGREM by OLS, 1979-1999 period        
EQ(12) 0,114 1,021 0,080 4,369 n.i. 0,001 0,000 -0,041 -0,052 0,216 0,159 0,115 
EQ(13) 0,093 n.i. 0,140 3,033 n.i. 0,000 0,200 0,000 -0,028 -0,038 0,096 0,115 
EQ(14) 0,023 0,980 0,085 n.i. n.i. 0,001 0,304 0,000 0,002 -0,069 0,151 0,111 
EQ(15) 0,026 0,982 0,085 0,183 n.i. 0,001 0,301 0,000 n.i. -0,069 0,152 0,111 
             
 1. (**) Indicate significance at 5% level         
 2. (*) Indicate significance at 10% level         
 3. (n.i) indicate that variable is not included in the estimation         
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 TABLE 7.2: Modelling DLOGREMPW by OLS        
            
 1) Modelling DLOGREMPW by OLS, 1979-1993 period        
            
  CONSTANT DLOGYHOST DLOGYDOM DBMP DROV DINTDIF DINFLATION GROWTH EXGOVDUM R^2 S.E. 
EQ(1) -0,155 *1,594 -8,428 **-0,012 0,003 *1,268  *-0.004 0,072 *-0,223 0,705 0,090 
EQ(2) 0,018 *1,516 n.i. **-0,012 0,003 *1,145 **-0,004 -0,007 *-0,187 0,686 0,086 
EQ(3) -0,160 0,652 -8,501 -0,006 0,003 0,986 n.i. 0,078 -0,132 0,450 0,113 
EQ(4) 0,003 *1,522 -0,781 **-0,012 0,003 *1,152    **-0.004 n.i. *-0,191 0,689 0,085 
EQ(5) -0,201 **1,680 -10,895 **-0,011 n.i. *1,282 **-0,004 0,096 **-0,272 0,679 0,086 
EQ(6) -0,013 **1,615 n.i. **-0,012 n.i. *1,226 **-0,003 n.i. **-0,225 0,607 0,084 
            
 2) Modelling DLOGREMPW by OLS, 1979-1999 period        
EQ(7) 0,114 0,082 4,341 n.i. 0,001 0,216 0,000 -0,040 -0,051 0,187 0,111 
EQ(8) 0,023 0,084 n.i. n.i. 0,001 0,305 0,000 0,002 -0,069 0,179 0,107 
            
 3) Modelling DLOGREMPW by OLS, 1965-1993 period        
EQ(9) **-0,537 0,512 **-27,402 -0,004 0,004 n.i. -0,001 **0,254 -0,055 0,409 0,133 
EQ(10) 0,060 0,627 n.i. *-0,005 0,005 n.i. -0,001 -0,007 -0,012 0,159 0,155 
EQ(11) 0,050 0,651 -0,934 *-0,005 0,005 n.i. -0,001 n.i. -0,015 0,173 0,153 
            
            
 1. (**) Indicate significance at 5% level        
 2. (*) Indicate significance at 10% level        
 3. (n.i) indicate that variable is not included in the equation        
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TABLE 7.3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR EQUATIONS WITH DLOGREM  
 
 
EQ1       
RSS        0.04716 sigma 0,09712 R^2 0,70633 Radj^2 0,17772 
LogLik    43.21710 AIC -4,42895 HQ -4,43397 SC -3,95691 
T               15 p 10 FpNull 0,38617 FpConst 0,39265 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,1361 0,7309     
normality test 1,7234 0,4225     
AR   1-4 test 0,3198 0,8483     
 
       
EQ2       
RSS        0.05062 sigma 0,09185 R^2 0,68477 Radj^2 0,26447 
LogLik    42.68585 AIC -4,49145 HQ -4,49597 SC -4,06662 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,28049 FpConst 0,28438 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0089 0,9286     
normality test 3,6281 0,163     
AR   1-4 test 0,1327 0,956     
 
       
EQ3       
RSS        0.08724 sigma 0,12058 R^2 0,45673 Radj^2 -0,26762 
LogLik    38.60358 AIC -3,94714 HQ -3,95167 SC -3,52231 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,71456 FpConst 0,73349 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0433 0,8434     
normality test 0,2112 0,8998     
AR   1-4 test 0,2389 0,8955     
 
       
EQ4       
RSS        0.04999 sigma 0,09128 R^2 0,68869 Radj^2 0,27361 
LogLik    42.77969 AIC -4,50396 HQ -4,50848 SC -4,07913 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,27322 FpConst 0,27691 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0025 0,9623     
normality test 3,3547 0,1869     
AR   1-4 test 0,1312 0,9568     
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EQ5       
RSS        0.05060 sigma 0,09183 R^2 0,68491 Radj^2 0,26479 
LogLik    42.68912 AIC -4,49188 HQ -4,49641 SC -4,06705 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,28023 FpConst 0,28412 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0619 0,8135     
normality test 2,4055 0,3004     
AR   1-4 test 0,2773 0,8727     
 
       
EQ6       
RSS        0.04998 sigma 0,09127 R^2 0,68878 Radj^2 0,27382 
LogLik    42.78182 AIC -4,50424 HQ -4,50877 SC -4,07941 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,27306 FpConst 0,27674 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,2198 0,6589     
normality test 3,7812 0,151     
AR   1-4 test 0,1157 0,9647     
 
       
EQ7       
RSS        0.05198 sigma 0,08617 R^2 0,6763 Radj^2 0,3526 
LogLik    42.48697 AIC -4,59826 HQ -4,60228 SC -4,22064 
T               15 p 8 FpNull 0,17537 FpConst 0,176 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,1191 0,7418     
normality test 3,7241 0,1554     
AR   1-4 test 0,2939 0,8662     
 
       
EQ8       
RSS        0.06922 sigma 0,0877 R^2 0,56892 Radj^2 0,32943 
LogLik    40.33842 AIC -4,57846 HQ -4,58147 SC -4,29524 
T               15 p 6 FpNull 0,12567 FpConst 0,12264 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1986:1) 1,1097 0,5515     
Chow(1992:1) 0,3564 0,567     
normality test 10,3934 0,0055     
AR   1-4 test 0,3578 0,8295     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,0912 0,9704     
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EQ9       
RSS        0.30630 sigma 0,12375 R^2 0,71291 Radj^2 0,59807 
LogLik    65.98185 AIC -3,92978 HQ -3,79689 SC -3,50545 
T               29 p 9 FpNull 0,00014 FpConst 0,00044 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,6392 0,7708     
Chow(1991:1) 0,5838 0,568     
normality test 4,125 0,1271     
AR   1-4 test 2,5941 0,076     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,3617 0,8312     
hetero test 20,1256 0,1672     
 
       
EQ10       
RSS        0.59473 sigma 0,16829 R^2 0,44257 Radj^2 0,25676 
LogLik    56.36071 AIC -3,33522 HQ -3,21709 SC -2,95804 
T               29 p 8 FpNull 0,01943 FpConst 0,05844 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,9082 0,5862     
Chow(1991:1) 1,1236 0,3458     
normality test 3,7463 0,1536     
AR   1-4 test 1,0911 0,3923     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,563 0,6938     
hetero test 1,5796 0,2784     
 
       
EQ11       
RSS        0.35110 sigma 0,1293 R^2 0,67092 Radj^2 0,56123 
LogLik    64.00281 AIC -3,86226 HQ -3,74413 SC -3,48508 
T               29 p 8 FpNull 0,00017 FpConst 0,00055 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,4675 0,893     
Chow(1991:1) 0,0277 0,9727     
normality test 10,6084 0,005     
AR   1-4 test 2,0851 0,1276     
ARCH 1-4 test 1,0844 0,4041     
hetero test 2,2739 0,1399     
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EQ12       
RSS        0.15959 sigma 0,11532 R^2 0,15932 Radj^2 -0,40114 
LogLik    51.23677 AIC -4,02255 HQ -3,9254 SC -3,5749 
T               21 p 9 FpNull 0,89548 FpConst 0,95857 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,6934 0,7183     
Chow(1997:1) 0,7597 0,493     
normality test 1,6479 0,4387     
AR   1-4 test 0,5762 0,6882     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,1573 0,9496     
       
EQ13       
RSS        0.17159 sigma 0,11489 R^2 0,09608 Radj^2 -0,39064 
LogLik    50.47529 AIC -4,04527 HQ -3,95891 SC -3,64735 
T               21 p 8 FpNull 0,91778 FpConst 0,98048 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,4271 0,8652     
Chow(1997:1) 1,1455 0,3533     
normality test 1,9091 0,385     
AR   1-4 test 0,9799 0,4649     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,0118 0,9996     
       
EQ14       
RSS        0.16116 sigma 0,11134 R^2 0,15102 Radj^2 -0,30612 
LogLik    51.13368 AIC -4,10797 HQ -4,02161 SC -3,71006 
T               21 p 8 FpNull 0,83533 FpConst 0,92618 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,3007 0,9351     
Chow(1997:1) 0,8592 0,4501     
normality test 1,9868 0,3703     
AR   1-4 test 0,7329 0,592     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,1517 0,9542     
       
EQ15       
RSS        0.16104 sigma 0,1113 R^2 0,15168 Radj^2 -0,3051 
LogLik    51.14184 AIC -4,10875 HQ -4,02239 SC -3,71083 
T               21 p 8 FpNull 0,83417 FpConst 0,92528 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,2955 0,9377     
Chow(1997:1) 0,8628 0,4487     
normality test 2,0162 0,3649     
AR   1-4 test 0,7224 0,5981     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,1475 0,9563     
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TABLE 7.4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR EQUATIONS WITH DLOGREMPW  
 
       
EQ1       
RSS        0.04802 sigma 0,08946 R^2 0,70525 Radj^2 0,31224 
LogLik    43.08154 AIC -4,54421 HQ -4,54873 SC -4,11938 
T               15 p 9 FpNull 0,28421 FpConst 0,24603 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,2209 0,6581     
normality test 1,0386 0,5949     
AR   1-4 test 0,0585 0,989     
 
       
EQ2       
RSS        0.05120 sigma 0,08553 R^2 0,6857 Radj^2 0,37139 
LogLik    42.59988 AIC -4,61332 HQ -4,61734 SC -4,23569 
T               15 p 8 FpNull 0,19676 FpConst 0,16253 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0016 0,9698     
normality test 2,3944 0,302     
AR   1-4 test 0,0972 0,9763     
 
       
EQ3       
RSS        0.08957 sigma 0,11312 R^2 0,45019 Radj^2 -0,09962 
LogLik    38.40577 AIC -4,0541 HQ -4,05812 SC -3,67648 
T               15 p 8 FpNull 0,66036 FpConst 0,60064 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0122 0,9158     
normality test 0,2792 0,8697     
AR   1-4 test 0,4932 0,7474     
 
       
EQ4       
RSS        0.05065 sigma 0,08506 R^2 0,68909 Radj^2 0,37817 
LogLik    42.68121 AIC -4,62416 HQ -4,62818 SC -4,24653 
T               15 p 8 FpNull 0,1913 FpConst 0,1578 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0001 0,9934     
normality test 2,1922 0,3342     
AR   1-4 test 0,0951 0,9771     
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EQ5       
RSS        0.05223 sigma 0,08638 R^2 0,6794 Radj^2 0,35879 
LogLik    42.45103 AIC -4,59347 HQ -4,59749 SC -4,21584 
T               15 p 8 FpNull 0,2071 FpConst 0,17151 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1992:1) 0,4003 0,5502     
normality test 3,1442 0,2076     
AR   1-4 test 0,1013 0,9745     
 
       
EQ6       
RSS        0.06396 sigma 0,0843 R^2 0,60741 Radj^2 0,38931 
LogLik    40.93187 AIC -4,65758 HQ -4,6606 SC -4,37436 
T               15 p 6 FpNull 0,11696 FpConst 0,08638 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1986:1) 0,3535 0,8742     
Chow(1992:1) 0,0916 0,7699     
normality test 8,0004 0,0183     
AR   1-4 test 0,0512 0,9935     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,0121 0,9992     
 
       
EQ7       
RSS        0.15959 sigma 0,1108 R^2 0,18741 Radj^2 -0,25014 
LogLik    51.23644 AIC -4,11776 HQ -4,0314 SC -3,71984 
T               21 p 8 FpNull 0,86019 FpConst 0,86763 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,5895 0,7696     
Chow(1997:1) 0,7702 0,4863     
normality test 1,7005 0,4273     
AR   1-4 test 0,6008 0,6717     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,1872 0,9352     
 
       
EQ8       
RSS        0.16117 sigma 0,10729 R^2 0,1794 Radj^2 -0,17229 
LogLik    51.13337 AIC -4,20318 HQ -4,12762 SC -3,855 
T               21 p 7 FpNull 0,78606 FpConst 0,79104 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1989:1) 0,3964 0,8927     
Chow(1997:1) 0,8801 0,4399     
normality test 1,9443 0,3783     
AR   1-4 test 0,7409 0,5854     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,1912 0,9344     
hetero test 17,0056 0,1077     
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EQ9       
RSS        0.36880 sigma 0,13252 R^2 0,40937 Radj^2 0,21249 
LogLik    63.28972 AIC -3,81308 HQ -3,69495 SC -3,4359 
T               29 p 8 FpNull 0,06548 FpConst 0,09188 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,8663 0,6137     
Chow(1991:1) 0,9939 0,3886     
normality test 2,3001 0,3166     
AR   1-4 test 1,9092 0,1552     
ARCH 1-4 test 1,0109 0,4372     
hetero test 22,5938 0,0468     
       
EQ10       
RSS        0.52537 sigma 0,15453 R^2 0,15861 Radj^2 -0,07086 
LogLik    58.15868 AIC -3,52819 HQ -3,42482 SC -3,19815 
T               29 p 7 FpNull 0,48789 FpConst 0,65907 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,2754 0,983     
Chow(1991:1) 0,0345 0,9661     
normality test 20,5136 0     
AR   1-4 test 0,6266 0,6496     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,3159 0,8626     
hetero test 3,4472 0,9834     
       
EQ11       
RSS        0.51624 sigma 0,15318 R^2 0,17324 Radj^2 -0,05224 
LogLik    58.41300 AIC -3,54572 HQ -3,44236 SC -3,21569 
T               29 p 7 FpNull 0,44149 FpConst 0,6028 
       
 value prob     
Chow(1979:1) 0,3137 0,972     
Chow(1991:1) 0,0158 0,9844     
normality test 19,0952 0,0001     
AR   1-4 test 0,7092 0,5961     
ARCH 1-4 test 0,2678 0,8938     
hetero test 3,6457 0,9792     
 
